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Abstract 
It has been recognized that individuals are representing a source contributing to a 
great proportion of environmental pollution as private consumption has elevated as a 
response to increased purchasing power.  Today’s culture where there exists a 
substantial consumption of new products, followed by a use and disposal culture, is 
not surprisingly resulting in increased disposal of waste at the household level.  In 
2008, on average, each citizen threw away 434 kilos of household waste.  Of this, 
only 227 kilos were sorted (SSB1, 2009). 
Although there is an increased awareness of how to use common resources on earth 
sustainably to secure future generations the same possibilities as today’s generations, 
we face the situation of a social dilemma.  This is represented by the beneficial effect 
for society when all cooperates and contributes with desired behavior, which is here 
sorting of household waste, whereas for the individual, it is not rational to cooperate 
with sorting, as he or she reaps the benefits of other’s contribution anyway.  Hence, 
although sorting has been regarded as a moral act, if everyone thinks and acts 
according to reaping the greatest benefits individually, society loose, and a collective 
choice problem has appeared.  Therefore, policies must be developed to promote 
socially desirable behavior since there seems to be a competition between rationality 
anchored in what is best for society, a ‘we-focus’ versus a rationality anchored in 
what is best at an individual basis, the ‘I-focus’.  
From January 2009, it is no longer legal to deposit organic waste, something that has 
led authorities to developing waste regimes for increasing sorting at source.  Each 
municipality could, however, decide what kind of regime to develop and use.  Ulstein, 
a municipality located in the south of Møre and Romsdal, Norway, introduced a 
differentiated fee on unsorted waste, to increasing incentives for sorting.  The system 
is based on weighing households’ unsorted waste when collected, which is taxed with 
2.24 NOK per kilo in addition to a moderate flat yearly fee (1356 NOK in 2009).  
Turning to theory, one finds different explanations for what motivates behavior when 
introducing an economic incentive.  In this study I have mainly made use of 
neoclassical economic theory, classical institutional theory, and theory from social 
psychology.  According to the neoclassical assumption, behavior is guided by external 
incentives, and individuals should not voluntarily be sorting household waste because 
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it represents a cost in time and effort.  Therefore, as the economic incentive is 
introduced, one expects a different response; no sorting now represents a cost through 
the fee and, accordingly, individuals will earn more if they sort by paying less.  The 
classical institutional position, on the other hand, takes its point of departure in 
societal values based on moral and ‘the right thing to do’.  Sorting of household waste 
is regarded as a moral contribution to society, which, by the introduction of an 
economic incentive, may be undermined by a shift in logic of why one is sorting.  
Nevertheless, there are different aspects contributing to explaining behavior.  Habits 
are found by the social psychologists to play a substantial role because it represents 
routinized behavior, which may not be based on continuous reasoning of why 
undertaking an act. The institutional position also recognizes habits, but finds habits 
to stem from conventions and norms.  Lastly, how individuals perceive themselves or 
wish to be perceived by society may contribute to explaining behavior, by focusing on 
feelings within the individuals when acting in accordance with what is seen as 
morally right. 
The goal of this thesis has been to investigate the effects of the waste regime in 
Ulstein, and its effect on motivation, and hence, behavior, to see what motivates 
sorting of waste at the household level.  This is specified through the following 
research questions: 
1. What is the level of waste sorting in Ulstein?  Has it changed with the 
introduction of the new regime?  
2. What motivates sorting of household waste in a regime using an economic 
incentive to promote sorting?  
3. What role do motivational factors play when explaining waste sorting 
behavior? And how could a change in fee affect sorting?  
Information about the households’ motivation and behavior related to sorting of waste 
has been collected through a web-based survey.  The sample exists of 197 randomly 
chosen households in Ulstein.  It is a quantitative study where the results are based on 
findings from statistical analyses of data. 
The results are represented by a sample with an overrepresentation of males, 66%, 
where 67.5% of the respondents are in age level 40-66 years.  43.7% holds a 
university degree, and 90.9% of the respondents live in houses.  The findings from the 
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study shows that the motivational factors for sorting of household waste are economic 
incentives, personal norms, social norms and encouragement from the authorities.  
The regimes infrastructure also seems to play a role for respondents to increase or 
begin sorting of household waste.  Knowledge about the attributes of the regime and 
attitude toward it did not prove to be a statistical significant factor for explaining 
behavior.  Neither did neighborhood institutions. 
There exists no numbers on earlier levels of household waste for comparison, but 
after the implementation of the new regime in January 2009, making use of a 
differentiated fee, 48% of the respondents states they have increased their sorting 
level.  51% of the respondents have stated their sorting level to be high, 20% that they 
are sorting quite much, and the rest rather low: 28%.  Hence, there is still a potential 
for improvements.  When looking at sorting of different waste categories, categories 
that are arranged for at source by the regime, like paper and plastic, are sorted at a 
high level.  Categories that the individuals have to arrange for he or her self, by 
bringing to return points, have a slightly lower sorting level.  Organic waste, a 
category that needs to be arranged for at source by the individual when not arranged 
for by the regime, is sorted at a very low level.  Nearly half states they are not sorting 
any of their organic waste, and this represents a challenge for the regime.  When 
asking about how hypothetically changes in the differentiated fee would affect sorting 
level, 26% states they would increase sorting and 54% would continue sorting at 
present level if it was increased from 2,24 NOK to 5,00 NOK, whereas if decreased to 
0,50 NOK, 76% would maintain and 10% would increase.  
The findings show that motivation clearly is important for explaining behavior.  In 
this study economic incentives have been found to be a significant factor for 
explaining behavior together with personal norms and habits.  Theory suggests a 
crowding out of personal norms when introducing economic incentives.  I cannot 
conclude whether or not there has been a crowding out as the incentive may have led 
to a compensated level of sorting.  If hypothetically decreasing the fee, on the other 
hand, would lead many to decreasing their effort, a crowding out effect could have 
been observed since a low fee would equal just a minor incentive, and hence, those 
solely motivated by the incentive would lower their efforts. 
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1. Introduction 
 
“Recycling is neither mysterious nor difficult; 
the biggest problem has shown to be to changing the habit from throwing everything 
into one bin to having several bins for different types of waste.  However, when a new 
habit is achieved; it does not take longer time, it is not more expensive, and it does not 
cause other problems than before.  A large part of the problem lies in the habits we 
choose to have regarding our disposal of the waste” 
(Teknologisk Institutt, 1995:47). 
 
1.1 Background 
During the last forty years mankind has used the same amount of goods and services as all the 
past generations together.  Most of these products are produced and used in the industrialized 
part of the world due to continuous improvements in technology and production processes.  
The increased supply of goods and services, elevated standards of living and a society ridden 
with time scarcity, has led to the development of a culture where use and disposal of goods is 
regarded as normal.  People choose simple and cheap products instead of lasting quality 
products, and throw away easily before buying new.  According to Statistics Norway (SSB1, 
2009), household waste has increased substantially, and in 2008, on average, each citizen 
threw away 434 kilos of household waste.  Of this, only 227 kilos were sorted.  Hence, one of 
the main challenges for the authorities is to reduce the amount of waste by increasing 
recycling and reuse at the household level through using policies that are promoting 
environmentally desirable behavior, since waste has become a result of our modern and 
consuming lifestyle (Teknologisk Institutt, 1995).  
 
Enhanced awareness of the consequences that our lifestyles have on the environment and its 
ecosystem services, has led to elevated focus on pro environmental behavior.  Pro 
environmental behavior can be defined as behavior aimed at reducing stress on natural 
resources as well as wise and sustainable use.  Increased consumption, leading to rising levels 
of household waste, has led to elevated attention in relation to the designing, and 
implementation of environmental policies and regimes.  Sorting and recycling of waste at the 
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household level is an area that has gained attention in the last couple of decades because it has 
been widely recognized that private consumption aggregates a substantial amount of waste.   
 
Because the environment, from which humans extract resources often is a common good, like 
for example air and water, the actions of one will affect opportunities faced by others.  Even if 
polluting on private, open or state grounds, one man’s actions have the potential to affect 
others.  For example, if my neighbor pollute, it will eventually affect me, and the opposite.  
Keeping this effect in mind, it should therefore be in the interest off all to contribute to 
preventing this effect by decreasing the impact on nature and people, as everyone then is 
better off.  In real life, however, it is seen that people do not always act in ways that are 
socially optimal; rather, they behave rational on an individual basis, pursuing what is best for 
themselves, regardless if their actions do not benefit society.  Although society would benefit 
more from cooperation in these situations, individuals reap greater benefits by not 
cooperating, and hence, we have a social dilemma situation.  Social dilemmas or “collective 
choice problems” are situations where conflicting interests arise and where outcomes may be 
rational for individuals but socially detrimental (Vatn, 2005:1).  Further, in situations where 
everybody seems to act in accordance with what is in the interest of all, individuals will cheat, 
or free ride because it benefits them more.  A free rider wants everyone to participate, 
whereas he himself does not, but only reap the benefits from others’ contribution (Vatn, 
2005).   
 
Until recently, in Norway, sorting efforts have, to a large extent, been a voluntary activity, 
mostly driven by a moral obligation to contributing to a cleaner and healthier environment.  
As a contribution to the common good, the more recycling, the less burning and depositing of 
waste, the better it is for the environment and, hence, the better it is for us.  Household waste 
is collected through different renovation facilities provided by the municipalities and 
transported to combustion facilities or deposits, both contributing to, amongst other things, 
increased emission of climate gases, environmental toxins and dust, all substances that have 
long term damaging effects on the environment and on human health.  
 
The authorities have, in several countries, implemented market-based instruments in order to 
promote desired behavior related to environmental concerns.  Weight based or volume based 
fee systems are introduced as an economic incentive for households to increase their levels of 
Mona Trehjørningen.                                                                                                     Environmental policy and human action. 
 3 
sorting and thereby gain more in the form of lower fees and, in addition, to underlining the 
importance of the activity by giving it a value.  
 
 
1.2  Purpose of the study 
The purpose of this study is to increase our knowledge regarding how motivational factors 
affect behavior when there eventually are environmental effects and indentify what is the 
motivation behind behavior under a specific regime using an economic incentive to promote 
sorting of household waste.  By assessing whether the regime has a positive or negative effect 
on motivation and behavior, the results may be of interests when the regime is evaluated, or 
when policies are developed to target a certain behavior.  Increasing our understanding of how 
motivation affect behavior as well as looking into what factors that are motivating individuals 
to behave in a desired manner, is important in situations where social dilemmas may occur, 
like sorting of waste.  
 
By looking into how a regime is affecting behavior at the individual or household level, this 
study will be able to help highlighting factors that need to be taken into consideration when 
designing environmental policies when what is desirable at the individual level, is not socially 
desirable.  Since avoiding social dilemmas is preferable, the policies aimed at targeting 
behavior should be designed to promote behavior that takes the welfare of all into 
consideration.  Because motivation is an important issue in this regard, identifying which 
motivational factors are dominating should be looked at.  It should also be worth 
remembering “the environmental impact of personal, private sphere environmentalism is 
important only in the aggregate when many people do the same thing” (Stern, 2000:10786).  
This may influence on individuals’ willingness to comply with regimes and institutions 
because if not implemented properly, the result may be limited acceptance of the regime if the 
average interpretation is that people do not comply or that the regime does not work, and 
hence, lack of will to contribute. 
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1.3 Objective and research questions 
 
Objective: 
The main objective of this study is to look at what motivates socially desirable behavior, 
sorting of waste, in a regime where a market based instrument in the form of an economic 
incentive, has been implemented to influence behavior.  Since sorting of waste historically has 
been based on a voluntary contribution to the common good, it is of interest to studying how 
or whether a market based mechanism is affecting motivation and hence behavior.  Is socially 
desirable behavior guided by norms, hence an institutional approach of how to behave in 
society or do economic gains and focusing on individual utility dominate, or are there other 
factors for explaining behavior? 
 
 
 
The research questions for this paper are the following:  
 
 
1. What is the level of waste sorting in Ulstein? Has it changed with the introduction 
of this new regime?  
 
2. What motivates sorting of household waste under a regime using an economic 
incentive to promote sorting?  
 
 
3. What role do motivational factors play when explaining waste sorting behavior? 
And how could a change in fee affect sorting?  
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2. Background information 
2.1 Historical perspective on waste 
Waste can briefly be defined as “something we do not want, or something we do not manage 
to use for its real intention or creation.  It can be an undesired bi-product stemming from a 
process, it can be something that is transformed to waste when its owner do not want to 
possess it any longer, or finally, when something is used in a way which does not fulfill its 
original purpose, it is transformed into waste” (Torstenson, 1995:6, my translation).   
Waste is perceived as something dirty and, culturally and historically recognized as pollution 
and an unwanted element (Torstenson, 1995).   
 
Organizations and large firms have been regarded as the greatest polluters, it is, however, 
more and more recognized that individuals act as a source contributing to a great proportion 
of environmental pollution.  Stern (2000) points to the reduction in pollution emanating from 
large firms due to formal regulations, which has led to an increased focus on individuals as 
becoming “an increased source of pollution” (Stern 2000:10785).  Although benefits from pro 
environmental behavior and awareness of the consequences of not acting in a pro 
environmental manner are widely recognized, the level of recycling and sorting of waste 
should become greater.  Today, sorting and recycling can be seen both as a response to 
increased consciousness, but also due to policies implemented by the authorities and 
information campaigns (Berglund, 2003; SSB1, 2009).   
 
Recycling is not a modern phenomenon, and by going back in history, literature reveals that 
waste recycling was also emphasized in earlier time periods.  Modern recycling is suggested 
to have begun during the World War II “as households were exhorted to save paper, 
cardboard, metals, rubber and other materials to contribute to the war effort […]. Monetary 
reward or environmental concern, it is concluded, was not the main motivation for 
participating” (Ackerman, 1997:15-16). 
 
Recently a field of environmental history, emphasizing waste and pollution and its influence 
on ecology, has started to emerge (Torstenson, 1995).  The increased awareness today 
regarding how waste is polluting and thus affecting the environment surrounding us, has led 
the authorities to designing and implementing different policies for trying to increase peoples’ 
motivation to enhancing their level of sorting.  Solid waste can be transformed through a 
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process of burning and organic waste can be transformed to dung, however, much can be 
reused and, therefore, has the potential to leave the chain and decrease the amount of 
unwanted waste and hence the level of pollution (Torstenson, 1995). 
 
2.2 The Norwegian regulations for management of household waste  
The main goal of Norwegian waste policy is to reduce the production of waste in addition to 
encouraging reusing and recycling.  In July 2009, a formal prohibition entered Norwegian law 
banning all dumping of organic dissolvable waste. However, municipalities in Norway 
currently pursue different strategies for encouraging waste sorting at source; no communal 
available arrangement for sorting - which is leaving households to decide for themselves the 
degree of sorting, municipalities with sorting and a flat fee and, lastly sorting with a 
differentiated fee in relation to volume or weight (Loop, 2009). 
 
Managing of household waste is in Norway under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of 
Environment and the Norwegian Authorities of Pollution Control.  These are the organs 
providing guidelines for waste management regulations.  The government’s objective is 
to enhance the level of knowledge about the burden our way of living is inflicting on 
the environment and stimulate to sustainable use of natural resources.  This objective, 
amongst other, is in accordance with the Brundtland-report of 1987; to avoiding harm 
on people and nature by emphasizing lessening of the burden we are putting on the 
environment, and thereby also to minimizing damage on people and land caused by 
waste.  This is done through focusing on the development of economic incentives and 
regulations, and policy instruments at this level, in addition by increasing knowledge 
and information.  The target at the national level regarding generating of waste is to 
keep it at a lower rate than the economic growth in the country 
(Miljøverndepartementet, 2007).  
 
The different municipalities hold the full responsibility of the collecting of waste and must 
decide on appropriate taxes to cover their expenditures on waste handling and management, 
for example a differentiated fee based on the weighing of household waste as seen in Ulstein. 
According to §34 in the regulations for waste, the municipalities should contribute to 
enhanced levels of recycling activities and emphasize waste reduction, and this can be done 
through introducing differentiated taxes.  Many waste companies are owned by more than one 
municipality and carry out their services across municipalities, in the private sector as well as 
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in the public sector.  The waste company, according to the operation of the company, suggests 
the fees but the municipality has the last say through voting in the commune-board 
(Miljøverndepartementet, 2007). 
 
Household waste is normally picked up by the curbside by waste trucks.  Other kind of trucks 
collects sorted waste like paper and plastic.  Waste that is not picked up by the trucks should 
be delivered to collection/return points that are placed in the local neighborhood.  This is 
typically clothing, glass without refund, metal, and environmentally harmful components like 
for example paint, oil and used batteries.  Electronic articles should be handed in to the 
nearest shop selling electronic articles.  In most municipalities in Norway, a system for 
collecting sorted paper and plastic as well as smaller amounts of special waste is established, 
and some have subsidized systems for compost (Miljøverndepartementet, 2007; Loop, 2009). 
 
2.3 Study Area 
Ulstein is a municipality situated in Møre and Romsdal in the south of Sunnmøre.  Measured 
last time, 01.07.2009, the number of inhabitants were 7 228.  Its city centre is Ulsteinvik with 
approximately 5000 of the inhabitants.  The municipality is rather small with an area of just 
97 km2.  According to statistics Norway only 0.3% of the inhabitants live in blockhouses or 
apartments, indicating that most of the inhabitants in the municipality live in houses (Garshol, 
2010). 
 
Ulstein did in 2009 establish a system for picking up household waste using trucks with a 
weight system for measuring the amount of household waste delivered by the households.  
The waste service is taxed with a rather modest fixed fee (1356 NOK) to pay for the services 
and, in addition, a differentiated fee (2,24 NOK) depending on the amount measured in 
kilograms of unsorted household waste delivered.  This structure of the renovation regime is 
intending to give households an economic incentive to increasing their efforts and levels of 
sorting as those who sort much are rewarded economically by paying less.  The more sorted 
waste one delivers-the less waste fee one has to pay and the more money one save 
(Reinhaldsverket, 2009).  
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Figure 1. Picture of the area surrounding Ulstein. (Source: Google maps, 2010) 
 
 
3. Theory 
In this study the main task is to study what motivate behavior when desired behavior puts a 
cost on the individual but benefits the society.  Desired behavior, which here is synonymous 
with sorting of household waste, has originally been interpreted and carried out as a voluntary 
act, however, since modern consumption patterns have led to massive amounts of waste 
accumulation together with a new law banning the use of landfills, new policies, using 
incentives to altering behavior, are being introduced.  
 
Sorting of waste is by no means a new phenomenon and it is of interest to assessing the effect 
of an inclination of an economic incentive because it is doubtful that the desired behavior can 
solely be explained by economic motivation.  Research has found that introducing external 
motivating factors, like economic incentives, in contexts where internal motivation dominates, 
may lead to a crowding out of the internal motivation.  A shift to a dependency on the external 
motivation may thus occur for maintaining the behavior based on internal motivation (Frey, 
1997).  Considering this, it is of interest to study what motivates behavior, when an external 
incentive is introduced. 
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This study is based on theory from neoclassical economic theory, game theory, classical 
institutional economic theory, sociology and social psychology, and in the following sections 
core aspects of these theories are presented. 
 
There are two main points of departure used in this study from which human behavior can be 
explained; the position regarding man as mainly pursuing his own interest, which we find in 
neoclassical economic theory, and the position holding institutions as important for man and 
where reality is seen as socially constructed guided also by social norms.  Alternative 
explanations are offered as well which are explaining behavior by using the utility function as 
a point of departure, and the existence of habits.  The different positions are presented in the 
following sections.  
 
3.1 Individual explanation: Neoclassical economic theory 
In line with the neo-classical position, individuals are assumed to be individually rational.  
Rational is in this position synonymous with maximization of individual utility.  The 
assumption is that individuals hold stable and given preferences and predefined capabilities, 
leading them to choosing the best option given these preferences and capabilities.  The 
position assumes information to be cost free and complete implying that transaction costs are 
zero.  Rationality is, according to Vatn (2005:113) “universally defined as maximizing 
individual utility”.  Vatn (2005) finds that acting rationally is consisting of two things, 
rational preferences and ability to make calculations.  Preferences are only rational if they are 
complete; they can be ranked, transitive; the ranking is logic, and continuous, they are 
distinguishable.  In neoclassical economic theory, equilibrium outcomes are created by 
rational individuals that are holding stable preferences, voluntarily participating and 
interacting to maximize utility (individual).  Because information- and transaction costs are 
held to be external, and private property rights for exchanged goods are ascribed to the 
individuals, the equilibrium outcomes are possible (Dobson and Palfreman, 1999).  
 
According to neoclassical economic theory, preferences are independent of contexts, which 
imply that “the choice is independent also of the social context – the institutional setting” 
(Vatn, 2005:114).  Maximizing own utility is what motivates, and “institutions are only 
regarded as external rules which are not forming individuals, rather, they only establish the 
stage at which the individuals act” (Vatn, 2005:11).  Etzioni (1988:5) holds, “the neoclassical 
paradigm either does not recognize collectives at all, or sees them as aggregates of 
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individuals, without causal properties of their own, and as external to the person.  The 
individual is viewed as standing detached from the community and from shared values, 
calculating whether or not to be a member, whether or not to heed the values’ dictates”.    
  
Policymaking is by the neoclassical stance, regarded as “a technically rational procedure” 
which is divided between the market and the state.  The latter’s task is to maximize social 
welfare, and this is especially important in situations where market failure occur.  Market 
failure is defined as situations where the costs arising are external to the market and where the 
role of the state is to “create solutions as if markets had existed” (Vatn, 2005:103).  In many 
situations, the individual utility maximization may be a good way of explaining how choices 
are made at the individual level; however, one may observe actions, which, according to 
neoclassical economic theory seems irrational by not being maximizing.  In the neoclassical 
position independency is emphasized; preferences are not influenced by other contexts.  This, 
however, can be questioned as people are seen to make choices that are depending on others’ 
choices.  This interdependency can be shown in game theory. 
 
Game theory 
According to the neoclassical position, social organization is accomplished through exchange 
(Etzioni, 1988).  When externalities occur, like pollution, one can say that the actions of one 
affect the opportunities faced by others.   In the case of pro environmental behavior and 
sorting of waste, negative externalities will be equivalent to pollution caused on the society by 
the waste from a household not sorting.  According to neoclassical economic theory, 
“members of a household will seek to maximize their total utility, which is just another way 
of saying that members of households try to make themselves as well of as they possibly can 
in the circumstances in which they find themselves” (Lipsey and Steiner, 1975 quoted in 
Etzioni, 1988:24).  Thus, if sorting of waste is perceived as costly, undertaking the activity is 
not rational and should therefore not take place in the individual’s household.  The same 
individual, however, will seek to reap the gains from others’ sorting of waste, and hence he or 
she would want others to sort.   
 
When externalities arise, predicting human behavior on the basis on maximization is not as 
easy.  In real life interdependency becomes apparent, as individuals will face situations in 
which trade-offs have to be made to avoid too large costs.  For example would costs 
associated with compensation in relation to household waste in this case be tremendous and, 
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the question is, how do individuals adjust in a situation where transaction costs are 
substantial?  The prisoner’s dilemma is a classical example used to show various outcomes of 
behavior when an individual is faced with different options of choice. 
 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma  
Game theory can be translated into many real-life situations, for example environmental 
problems like sorting of waste.  It aims to predict “how rational individuals make decisions 
when they are mutually interdependent” (Romp, 1997:1).  Game theory shows that in many 
situations, the welfare of one depends on another person’s actions.  Most often the games are 
found to be non-cooperative, and players are individualistic and self-regarding (rational), and 
not able to make binding agreements, unless it is in their self-interest.  This means that 
individuals have incentives to act strategically so as to reap the greatest benefits according to 
their preferences.  This can be illustrated through a prisoner’s dilemma game:   
 
A prisoner’s dilemma game is a game played by two prisoners, which are held in 
confinement.  They do not have the possibility to talk to each other, and the game is about 
how they are faced with an opportunity to lower their imprisonment depending on their level 
of cooperation.  In this game, options are viable, but the one player does not know the move 
of the other player (italics added) (Romp, 1997).   
 
Individuals face two options, either to cooperate or to defect/free ride.  If the collective is to 
benefit, however, everyone must participate.  It is, on the other hand, rational on an individual 
basis not to cooperate and thereby save time, effort or money as the individual would gain if 
all others but him or her cooperates.  In addition, the individual might think that his or her 
action would not make a substantial contribution for the environment, and thereby, what is 
rational for the individual is socially detrimental.  Following figure is an example on a 
prisoner’s dilemma game between a household and the collective. 
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Figure 2. Matrix on the prisoner’s dilemma. Source: (Vatn 2005) 
 
Household I face two options: sorting (cooperating) or no sorting (defecting).  Household I 
will be better off if other households are sorting whereas household I itself does not (II). 
Thereby household I will avoid the costs associated with the activity like smell, time-use, 
pests and vermin, and at the same time enjoy the benefits stemming from the activity 
undertaken by other households, like less pollution, smell, and so on.  If other households (II) 
defect, then household I stand to loose from sorting (III) as it will face all individual costs but 
only minimal, if any, effect of pollution.  An eventual optimum would be if every household 
mutually agrees to cooperate (I).  This optimum, however, is not reached because all 
households are choosing strategically, that is defecting, and the outcome is that no one are 
sorting (IV) which is not the best option for society at all.   
 
The prisoner’s dilemma represents a problem of social order, and can be described as a war of 
all against all, indicating that there is a gain for all by cooperating, however, from an 
individual point of view, it is most rational to defect as the individual assumes that the other 
chooses strategic and rational.  The neoclassical paradigm is according to Etzioni (1988:ix) 
“utilitarian, rationalistic-individualistic and, applied not only to the economy, but also to the 
full array of social relations”.  
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3.2 Classical Institutional Economic Theory 
Questions have been raised about the approximation of interpreting individuals as maximizing 
own utility and using this when explaining behavior, and Etzioni (1988) find people to have 
more than one ‘want’, utility, as seen in neoclassical economics.  Accordingly, they do live up 
to moral values, he claims, and are choosing means not only on the basis of selfishness and 
rationality, but based on emotions and values.  Individuals are members of a community and 
shaped by the institutions within this community, thus acting within a larger system, the social 
context, a context that consists of institutions.  This context is, according to Etzioni (1988:5) 
perceived as “a legitimate and integral part of one’s existence, a ‘we’, a whole of which 
individuals are constituent elements” which leads us to the next position of importance in this 
paper. 
 
Classical institutional economic theory represents an alternative way of explaining human 
behavior and motivation.  Society is interpreted as consisting of institutions that are built up 
over time and, which by Berger and Luckmann (1967:71) are defined as “shared habitualized 
actions available to all members of a social group”.  Humans are shaped and regularized by 
processes rooted in institutions, which are socially defined constructs that regularize human 
action in situations where many individuals are involved and without holding the same 
interests (Vatn, 2005).   
 
Institutions can be defined as “cognitive, normative, and regulative structures that provide 
stability and meaning to social behavior” (Scott, 1995 quoted in Vatn, 2005:10) by “mediating 
the contexts of choice” (Vatn, 2009:188).   Defining what is seen as the right thing to do 
socially by highlighting which rationality should be pursued, plural rationality, which is 
rationality based on what is best for society, is seen as one of the functions of institutions.   
Institutions present in society today, and well known by all, are: language; how to 
communicate, throwing trash in bins placed on public places, and finally, the law which is 
legally defining what one may or may not do. 
 
The role of institutions: the institutionalization process.   
“People are the products of the social conditions under which they grow up and live, they are 
formed by the institutions of society”, and everything is socially constructed.  Society is 
“perceived through concepts that are collectively produced” (Berger and Luckmann, 1967 
quoted in Vatn, 2005:11).   
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Institutions function to help humans act in the right way, more precisely, doing what is 
rational and expected in society in which they live.  Since humans can only be said to be 
boundedly rational, meaning that in a complex world they have no possibility knowing about 
every option available, and therefore are choosing the best option that is available for them, 
institutions work as guidance for their choices. What is considered as the right behavior in a 
situation affect preferences and it is not always individual preferences that count.  
Nevertheless, different settings are supporting different rationalities, and in some contexts 
what matters for society is of utter importance whereas in other contexts pursuing own 
interest is regarded as the right act, depending on the present institution (Vatn, 2005). 
 
Vatn (2005:79) argues, “a high level of (local) acceptance of rules and rights largely creates a 
self-policing environment.  People will normally abstain from causing what is considered to 
be a nuisance.  Those who still violate the rules will have to face the reactions of people living 
there”.  Hence, institutions are often “formed to secure that the cooperative outcome becomes 
a viable option” (Vatn, 2009:189).  Berger and Luckmann (1967:99) conclude “institutions 
have a tendency to persist” when a pattern of behavior is established in society, and by 
adhering to institutions under different societal settings, human behavior is guided towards a 
state agreed upon by society or decided upon by authorities.  Not complying may lead to 
sanctions; moral or legal, or, both, depending on the situation (Vatn, 2005).  Institutions 
consist of conventions, norms and formal rules, and are presented below.   
 
Conventions 
Conventions are “codes of behavior” (North, 1990:4); they simplify life by “coordinating 
behavior through creating regularity“(Vatn, 2005:6).  Vatn (2005:63) states, “the typical 
characteristic of a convention is that it solves a coordination problem by structuring and 
classifying”.   
 
A convention can be said to be developed from below, that is, behavior that is learned and 
repeated and which eventually becomes the norm; how things should be done.  North (1990) 
is defining conventions as informal, as they have no roots in formal regulations but are 
developed over time as the most rational way of doing things.  Conventions are first of all 
how things are being done practically.  Then they can be transformed into norms, which imply 
that individuals accept the rationality behind the acts and begin to conduct the behavior 
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because it is interpreted as the right way of doing things, they have become socially accepted 
cues.  Examples of conventions are language, greeting by shaking the right hands, or throwing 
litter in the trashcan - to keep it tidy. 
 
Norms 
Schwartz (1970:130) defines norms as “social specifications of desirable behavior in 
particular situations that provide the actor with potential directions for his or her action to 
take”.  Norms are by Vatn (2005:7) defined as “responses to questions regarding what is 
considered the right or appropriate behavior” and, thus, internalized through processes in life.  
Norms support the values around which they are formed as they are followed, and in general 
Vatn (2005:7) holds that norms are “concerned how we treat our fellows”.    
 
A norm says what you ought to do or not, and failure to adhere to recognized social norms 
might entail a threat of social sanctions, either imagined or real, and if that is the case, the 
norm cannot be said to be internalized in the individual.  “If norms are fully internalized, they 
are followed independently of whether others know and can punish those breaking the norm” 
(Vatn, 2005:123).  Additionally, not following the norm may lead to a feeling of guilt because 
behavior deviates from what the individual regard as morally desirable behavior.  When the 
guilt feeling occurs, external sanctions will not be necessary because the right behavior is 
chosen over the undesired one.  Further, when norms become internalized: this is how one 
should do it, and the act is routineously performed, it may develop into a habit.  Since 
individuals interpret behavior that is accepted by society easily, a behavioral pattern is 
generalized as a norm and eventually internalized so as to become the pattern of behavior.  
Normative behavior may indeed also be a response to reasoning done by the individual to 
avoiding either social sanctions or the guilt feeling occurring from not adhering to a social 
norm or an internalized norm (Berger and Luckmann, 1967).  
 
Both conventions and norms may transform into habits, because when “learned sequences of 
acts […] have become automatic responses to specific cues” […], the result is a habit 
(Verplanken and Orbell, 2003:1314).  A habit is behavior that originally was intentional but 
that has developed into behavior based on routine and repetition, no matter whether the 
behavior is regarded as morally correct or not.  Habits can be developed through a learning 
process, either internalized via conventions; like a child seeing how its parents perform an 
action and then the child repeats it, norms; interpreting that this is how it should be done, or 
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habits can be developed through experience and due to bounded rationality.  Hence, habits 
can be explained differently; originating from conventions and as a repetitive response to a 
coordination problem, or from norms as a response to how procedures are interpreted as 
morally right or because individuals are boundedly rational and has an established routine.  
 
Vatn (2005:119) understand habits as “forms into which satisfying rules materialize […] via 
procedures that are seen as capable of producing satisfactory results”.  Verplanken and Orbell 
(2003:1314) hold that “behavior may become automatic through satisfactory repetition of a 
specific response that is triggered by a specific cue in the environment”.  Accordingly, when a 
habit is developed, individuals no longer need to make decisions but act automatically, 
however, as a side effect; the reasoning behind performing an act is lost.  This makes habits 
efficient in the sense that “they free mental capacity to do other things at the same time, for 
example in situations with too much information, time pressure or distraction” (Verplanken 
and Orbell, 2003:1317).  On the other hand, when behavior is performed only based on 
routine, the side effects may become an issue, like for example pollution from always driving 
a car when going somewhere, always throwing household waste into the same bin, or non 
responsiveness to price signals and other behavior performed on routine.   
 
Bargh (1994,1996, quoted in Verplanken and Orbell, 2003:1317) find that automatic 
processes in our daily lives are characterized more or less by four different features, 
“unintentionality, uncontrollability, lack of awareness and, efficiency”.  Accordingly, “habits 
can be characterized as behavior that is intentional in its origin, is controllable to a limited 
extent, is executed without awareness, and lastly, is efficient” (p.1317).  Social psychologists 
find habits to be intentional by being functional and goal directional, rather than to being 
conscious and planned, like taking the car automatically to go somewhere.  The goal is to 
efficiently reach the destination.  On the other hand, they find that habits have an ability to 
appear uncontrollable by being tough to overrule, and additionally, habits work as triggers of 
future behavior.  “In principle, habits should be controllable by deliberate planning and 
thinking” (Verplanken and Orbell, 2003:1317), but “given that fully rational deliberation 
about all aspects of behavior is impossible because of the amount of information and 
computational competence involved, human agents have acquired mechanisms for relegating 
particular ongoing actions from continuous rational assessment” (Hodgson, 1988:125).   
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From a social psychological angle, the fact that since “habits are part of how we organize 
everyday life” […], they are seen as a possible reflection of “[…] identity or personal style” 
(Verplanken and Orbell, 2003:1317).  Habits are also held to play a role in economic 
behavior, due to the embossment of routine, but the neoclassical economists do not recognize 
the importance of habits as routine.  Rather, habits are seen as purposeful and rational action 
undertaken because it will be too costly to changing the behavior (Hodgson, 1988).  This view 
is questioned as it is argued, “in general, people do not knowingly perceive or calculate the 
cost of dropping a habit.  Nor do they always acquire habits from conscious and rational 
choice” (Hodgson, 1988:125).  In addition follows the question of bad habits if habits are seen 
to represent optimality. 
 
Formally sanctioned rules 
Formal rules are the last institutional construct.  “Rules are backed by the formalized power 
and sanctions of the collective; of third parties like the state” (Vatn, 2005:7).  These rules, 
backed by the authorities, will have the ability of sanctioning behavior classified as forbidden 
by law.   For example, violating private property rights may lead to formalized punishment, 
like a fine, but also stricter methods exists, like prison.  Formal rules help creating order 
where interests may be conflicting in the collective era, like for example when social 
dilemmas arise like shown in the section presenting game theory, and helps maintaining 
different regimes (Vatn, 2005).  Formal rules are the last institutional tool used to create order 
in society, and they are implemented when situations occur where behavior must be regulated 
and gains must be transferred from rational individuals to society.  Formally sanctioned rules 
are based upon adopted proposals from political parties, and environmental policy has gained 
increased attention the last decades as it has become more and more evident that human 
lifestyle is degrading the environment and, hence, is limiting the possibilities for future 
generations. 
 
Environmental policy 
Policies are by the neoclassical stance regarded as a technically rational procedure, divided 
between the market and the state.  The latter’s task is to maximize social welfare, and this is 
especially important in situations where market failure occur.  Market failure is defined as 
situations where the costs arising are external to the market and where the role of the state is 
to “create solutions as if markets had existed” (Vatn, 2005:103).  Pollution can be seen to be a 
market failure and is an outcome of a practical problem.  People pollute because they solve 
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the problem they face in the cheapest way they can.  The main task for policy is thus to create 
solutions to the pollution problem by establishing incentives or rules preventing the actual 
behavior by providing alternatives.  One such alternative is incentives.  Incentives are 
“something that attracts or repels people and leads them to modify their behavior in some 
way” (Field and Field, 2002:6).  An economic incentive have the effect of channeling effort in 
a certain direction, and most often economic incentives are related to payoffs in economic 
terms.  There are, however, incentives that, appearing non-material, also may direct behavior 
in the desired way.  Examples are “the desire to preserve a beautiful visual environment or the 
desire to set good examples for others” (Field and Field, 2002:6).  The welfare of the 
individual is for some, and most often economists, considered being the major desideratum of 
public policy.  However, social regulation should not be grounded in individual values and 
preferences.  For environmentalists, the welfare of society is of high importance and 
regulation should be based on the values shared by society as a whole (Field and Field, 2002). 
 
In Ulstein a new way of paying for renovation services was introduced at the beginning of 
2009, which use economic incentives to alter behavior related to sorting of household waste. 
The idea is that providing an economic incentive for reduced delivery of household waste 
would encourage households to increase their sorting an thereby limit their household waste 
production as this would cost them less than if they were sorting little or moderately.  In 
addition, it provides incentives to search for other ways to reducing the production of waste, 
for example by buying foods without wrapping and start composting organic waste.  Before 
the new system, households were paying a flat annual fee for having their waste picked up.  
This old system, however, offered no incentives beside moral values for households to 
increase their sorting, as the price did not differ whether one sorted all or nothing. 
 
3.3 Rational choice and expanding the individual utility function  
In addition to the institutional explanation holding institutions and plural rationality as most 
important when explaining behavior, and the neoclassical position focusing on individual 
maximization, there is another way of explaining behavior, which is an expansion of the 
neoclassical economic theory, regarded as a response to the institutional orientation.  This is 
an alternative to plural rationality, which is focusing on expansion of the utility function, 
however, in another way than economic.  Rational choice is here synonymous with 
maximizing individual utility and expansion of the utility function like in neoclassical theory, 
however, instead of seeing utility in monetary terms, the individual’s personal and inner 
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feelings are held to be the motivating factor and which is leading to certain behavior in 
various situations (see for example Deci, 1975; Frey, 1997, Andreoni, 1990; Thøgersen, 
1994).  
 
3.3.1 The intrinsic motivation model  
Psychologists find that individuals behave following motives coming from within; they are 
“induced by inner feelings” (Frey, 1997:13).   Intrinsic motivation can be defined as 
motivation coming from within by the underlying desire or pleasure experienced by 
performing the action.  The reward is the activity, which leads to the feeling of pleasure or 
desire (Frey, 1997).   
 
Action based on intrinsic motivation expands the individual’s utility function through 
producing a satisfaction in the individual, and which will lead to the continuing of performing 
such acts.  By behaving supportive to social norms, the individual may experience a good 
feeling when undertaking the action because he or she knows this is the right behavior.  
Extrinsic motivation, on the other hand, is behavior motivated by factors external to the 
individual, like the fear of sanctions for not complying with social norms, economic 
incentives or legislation.   
 
Theory on motivation suggests that intrinsic motivation can be both motivated, but also 
substituted by external incentives.  For example, Frey (1997) has suggested that, in the 
psychological process, external incentives like economic incentives undermine intrinsic 
motivation due to what he calls the ‘the hidden cost of reward’, which has a function of 
crowding out the original motivation.  When introducing external incentives that crowds out 
internal motivation, the individual now only will carry out the behavior if compensated for.  
The original motivation has been crowded out and substituted by selfish reasoning of whether 
carrying out the behavior or not.  Thøgersen (1994) finds that the inner feelings may be 
affected in different ways, and presumably by the outside interferences.  The damaging effect, 
leading to a passing of responsibility related to the task to the intervening force, together with 
a cease in the feeling of being acknowledged for undertaking the performance, is followed by 
a removal of the exhibition of motivation.  If personal norms through the use of an external 
incentive like an economic incentive are found to being rendered irrelevant, Thøgersen 
(2003:200) has found “the behavioral impact of the regulation could be severely reduced and 
perhaps even reversed”.  He further holds that “a person’s own interest in the behavior 
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becomes discounted when he or she is given an extrinsic reason for doing something he or she 
would have done anyway” (Thøgersen, 2003:198).  
 
3.3.2 The warm glow of giving hypothesis:  
Literature reveals that behavior can be based on maximizing individual utility based on the 
inner feelings of warm glow within an individual.  These feelings arise when the individual is 
acting in ways sympathetic to others, for example contributing to something that is interpreted 
as socially desirable, and thereby provides the individual with a good inner feeling - a warm 
glow.  The warm glow is perceived as a gain to the individual, whereas the contribution as a 
cost (Andreoni, 1990).  Behaving in ways sympathetic to others often represents a cost on the 
individual, both in economic terms, but also regarding time and effort.  The costs are, 
however, “outweighed by a satisfaction which is at least as great as the offer involved” (Vatn, 
2005:124).   
 
This warm glow is also referred to as selfish or impure altruism, as it presents an altruistic act 
that is founded upon maximization of individual utility.  People do actually get rewards for 
behaving altruistically as they from the act alleviates their own feelings of sympathy for, in 
example, another person in pain.  Thereby, the motive is not actually altruistic, however, but 
to relieve a feeling in one self and thereby feel better (Darley and Latané, 1970).   Sober and 
Wilson (1998) calls pursuing the warm glow egoism because even though an act may be 
other-regarding, the act is, as an end, self-regarding because the preferences of an egoistic 
individual is satisfied when others are better off, because it produces the good feeling.  
According to Sen (1977:326) “it can be argued that behavior based on sympathy is in an 
important sense egoistic, for one is oneself pleased at others’ pleasure and pained at others’ 
pain, and the pursuit of one’s own utility may thus be helped by sympathetic action.  It is 
action based on commitment rather than sympathy, which would be non-egoistic in this 
sense”. 
 
Often acts are performed because this is how one is raised, but social pressure, sympathy or 
guilt, pursuit of prestige, respect, as well as “other social or psychological objectives” (Olson 
1965 quoted in Andreoni, 1990:464) are factors contributing to the decision of performing an 
act.  Nevertheless, helping an old lady crossing the street may in fact be an internalized norm 
working via a guilt feeling if not adhered to (Vatn, 2005; Biel and Thøgersen, 2007).  
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3.3.3 The self-image hypothesis: 
Research reveals that people do contribute to charity and do participate on a voluntary basis 
even though these contributions represent a cost.  Neoclassical theory finds it hard to explain 
why individuals still contribute.   Brekke et al. (2003:1967), have used an economic model to 
explaining moral motivation, and found that “consumers prefer regarding themselves as 
socially responsible individuals, […] and are contributing to public goods by this preference”.   
 
The self-image hypothesis assumes individuals to “think of themselves as socially responsible 
individuals” (Brekke et al. 2003:1969), acting within a set of institutions that more or less 
signals what is the appropriate behavior, and, hence, must decide upon how to act; trading off 
desires for leisure with desires for acting in a socially desirable manner to achieve a good self-
image.  “Self-image is determined by a comparison of one’s actual effort to the morally ideal 
effort” (p.1969).  By deviating from behavior regarded as socially desirable, the individual 
may face the feeling of guilt, which can be seen to representing a cost.  
 
3.4 Theory of cognitive dissonance. 
When things do not make sense psychologically, they produce dissonance.  According to Bem 
(1956, in Aronson 1978:194), “a person is the observer of his own behavior, […] and if a 
person observes that he performed for a large reward; he is less apt to believe that the 
behavior was a reflection of his real attitudes than if he performed it for a small reward” 
(p.194).  Cognitive theories in social psychology suggest that people act in order to obtain 
rewards and that “activities which are associated with rewards tend to be repeated” (p.200).    
 
“Dissonance is a negative drive state which occurs whenever an individual simultaneously 
holds two cognitions (ideas, beliefs, opinions) which are psychologically inconsistent” 
(Aronson, 1978:182).  It is argued to be an unpleasant state that the individual seeks to reduce 
by altering the cognitions to make them more compatible, by adding consonant cognitions, 
with each other.  Aronson (1978:183-184) holds that “dissonance theory does not rest upon 
the assumption that man is rational, rather it suggests that man is rationalizing – that he 
attempts to appear rational, both to others and to himself”; people reduce dissonance by 
“emphasizing the positive aspects and deemphasize the negative aspects of the chosen 
alternative while doing the opposite with the un-chosen one” (p.184).   
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Summary of different types of motivation 
In summary, motivation plays a significant role for explaining behavior.  The figure below 
gives a clear overview of the different types of motivations. 
 
 
Figure 3. Different motivations. 
 
Internal motivation is constituted by personal norms and social norms, and may if or when 
transformed into routinized behavior, transform into habits.  Habits are persistent behavior, 
which may be difficult to alter because the reasoning behind the behavior eventually is lost 
when routinized.  Expansion of the utility function is another theory that can also be a part of 
internal motivation.  Through the achievement of good feelings and warm glow, increased 
self-image and so forth by acting, the individual is motivated to continuing the behavior. 
 
External motivation is motivation based on external incentives.  This can be legal prohibitions 
or market based instruments like economic incentives, which intends to promoting desired 
behavior by “changing the relative costs and benefits of environmentally beneficial behavior 
in order to make it profitable for the individual to behave in accordance with the collective 
interest” (Thøgersen, 1994:409).  Additionally, external motivation has the ability to create 
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norms by influencing on individuals’ interpretation of the importance of the reason for 
implementing external incentives. 
 
3.5 Analytical framework for explaining behavior 
Many factors may play a role in shaping motivation behind socially desirable behavior.  The 
new system for sorting household waste in Ulstein, introduced in 2009, is based on economic 
incentives to promoting socially desired behavior by making it individually favorable to 
comply.  Sorting has, nevertheless, and as mentioned in the introductory part, taken place 
without external incentives, and hence has been carried out on a voluntary basis.  Therefore, 
since sorting of waste has not been enforced by formal law at any time, and perceived as a 
voluntary act, other explanations should be added.  In chapter 3.1 – 3.3 different theories for 
explaining motivation and behavior were introduced, showing how individuals face different 
options regarding choice of behavior.  In reality, however, the situation is more complex.  
Various factors may influence on the choices made by individuals, and therefore, I have 
developed a framework to try to explain how these factors may influence on behavior.  
According to the theory used, it has been relevant to develop a framework based on work by 
Vatn (2005) and Ajzen (1991) 2. 
 
Vatn’s (2005) framework for analyzing issues regarding use of resources is mainly depending 
on attributes of the resource and available technology, agents and agents’ choices, institutions 
and, patterns of interaction.  Ajzen’s (1991) framework ‘theory of planned behavior’ holds 
subjective norms, attitudes and perceived behavior control to be of importance for the 
individual’s intentional behavior because intention and perceived control are factors 
explaining behavior.  The original frameworks are included in appendix III. 
 
 
 
                                                
2 For more information about the original frameworks used as point of departure for my framework, see Vatn (2005) and Ajzen (1991). 
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Figure 4. Framework for analyzing behavior. Source: Vatn (2005) Ajzen (1991). 
 
In the modified framework for this study, the upper left box represents attributes of the 
resource, which in this case will be equal to the perceived possibility of action based on the 
type of housing the respondent posits.  The middle left box represents institutions like 
conventions, norms and legal rules.  Because this study only looks at one regime, the most 
important institution, the regime, is constant in this analysis.  However, social norms 
represented by how neighborhood institutions are perceived, is included.  The lower left box 
represents characteristics of the individuals, including socioeconomic variables.  
Socioeconomic variables are used as control variables in the statistical analysis and therefore 
no hypotheses are developed for these variables. 
 
Attributes of the resource/perceived possibilities of action, institutions and individuals’ 
characteristics all have the potential to influence on an individual’s motivation and behavior, 
as well as on habits.  Habits are, like already mentioned, routineously performed behavior 
where the original reasoning behind the behavior is ‘lost’.  Thus, habits may stem from 
conventions and norms and from internal as well as external motivation.  I will not look at 
what affects habits, but how habits affect behavior.  Knowledge also has the potential to affect 
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behavior; through increased knowledge about, for example, the damaging effect on the 
environment, people may get motivated to sort.  By gathering information about the regime 
and its function, people also may get motivated to sort.  I will only look at how knowledge 
may affect behavior.  The stippled arrows represent relationships that I will not focus on in 
this study. 
 
In the following sections I will present the different variables and related hypotheses. 
 
Attributes of the resource/ possibility of action 
Type of housing may be of importance for the level of sorting due to the issue of space in the 
kitchen.  Other studies have found this to be an important factor influencing on the level of 
sorting (see for example Sannerød, 2003).  Because houses have larger room sizes than 
apartments, it is easier to change the sorting facilities without considering space limitations, 
and thereby have capacity to sort more.  When living in houses, the possibility of having 
composting facilities in your garden increases as well. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Respondents living in houses sort more than respondents living in apartments. 
 
Individuals’ characteristics 
Individuals’ characteristics may be of importance for both motivation and behavior.  
Literature shows that women are more environmentally concerned than men (see for example 
Robbins, 2004).  Some also hold that well educated individuals and those with higher income 
take more action to reduce negative environmental impacts (Vining, 1990).  Further, since 
environmental concern is a topic of high relevance of today, one may think that younger 
people should be more aware of consequences of our consuming lifestyle.  Due to insecurity 
of who in the household has actually replied, there may be some insecurity related to the list 
of respondents.  The variables on individuals’ characteristics have no related hypothesis but 
are included in the analyses.  
 
Institutions 
Behavior and motivation are depending on institutions that are present in society, and to 
which extent individuals can be seen to follow or act in accordance with these.  Since 
conventions represents learned responses to solving a problem, norms what ought to be done 
both in personal terms (internal) and social (external) terms, and legal rules are regulations by 
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law ordering or forbidding certain behavior, these are all factors affecting behavior both 
trough creation of habits and motivation.  Since I do not have information on the situation in 
Ulstein before the waste regime was introduced, this institution is constant in this study. 
However, some indications on how institutions work may be possible to draw through 
examining the issue of perceived social norms in the neighborhood. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Neighborhood institutions in the form of perceived neighborhood norms 
influence on behavior. 
 
Habits 
Waste is something most of us relate to every day through different kinds of packaging, like 
food and other household items, and through disposal of these items.  Therefore, habits may 
have developed and affect how we behave by becoming performance based on routines and 
not reflection. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Respondents who sort their waste habitually have a high level of sorting. 
 
Knowledge 
Knowledge about the waste regime and the fee implemented to influence respondents’ sorting 
of household waste has the potential to affect motivation for performing the desired behavior.  
Hence, it is interesting to assess whether respondents with system-knowledge have a higher 
level of sorting than those who have not, because if the individual knows how the system 
works and how much the fee is, this knowledge should influence behavior.  In addition to 
knowledge, individuals’ perception and attitude towards the regime may have an effect.  
 
Hypothesis 4a: System knowledge increases the level of sorting. 
 
Hypothesis 4b: Attitude to the system is related to sorting. 
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Environmental concern 
Individuals with a high environmental attitude or concern are expected to be aware of the 
consequences our consumption and thus waste production have for the environment. 
Therefore, one believes that a high environmental concern is equivalent with a high level of 
sorting. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Environmental concern has a positive effect on sorting. 
 
Behavior and motivation for sorting of waste 
Motivation is, accordingly, the most important factor for explaining behavior.  Like shown in 
the figure summarizing the differences between internal and external motivation, individuals 
can be motivated differently by different factors.  Both external and internal factors may 
influence motivation, and hence, for policy makers it is quite interesting to see how and 
whether external factors have the ability to influencing behavior.  
 
Hypothesis 6a: Holding a personal norm concerning sorting of waste results in increased 
sorting. 
 
Hypothesis 6b: The economic incentive motivates to increased sorting.  
 
Hypothesis 6c: Acknowledging a social norm concerning sorting of waste results in increased 
sorting.  
 
Hypothesis 6d: Encouragement from the authorities increases the sorting level. 
 
 
Crowding out 
Crowding out, presented in the theory part, is an issue that cannot be included in the analysis 
here; however, I will include some comments on this phenomenon, as it can be present.  Like 
presented in the chapter about intrinsic motivation, crowding out is when external rewards 
crowds out or undermines internal motivation and there is a shift to motivation or behavior 
solely based on external incentives. 
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4.  Methods  
The design of this study is based on descriptive and explorative design.  The intention is to 
describe the situation in a defined area by investigating the subject closer.  To collecting data 
for testing my hypotheses, I developed a questionnaire together with a PhD student who will 
use this study as a pilot.  The original questionnaire contains 35 questions.  The development 
of the questionnaire is presented in section 4.2.  To be able to analyzing the raw data I have 
from the survey, I need to make use of different statistical analytical tools.  The statistical 
procedures are described in section 4.2. 
 
4.1 Method for data collection 
The collection of data was carried out through using a questionnaire.  We chose a 
questionnaire because this is a good way of gathering information.  500 randomly chosen 
respondents where drawn from a provided member list from Søre Sunnmøre waste company 
(SSR) containing over 2000 subscribers to the waste service.  We did this to make sure that all 
the participants were related to the same regime.  
 
The intention was at first to mail the questionnaire out by post mail.  However, this proved to 
be very expensive, and therefore, it was decided that the invitation letter should be sent by 
post mail, whereas the questionnaire should be a web based survey.  The advantages with a 
web based survey are: limited costs, less job for the respondent not having to send anything 
back, less work with plotting statistics and, of course, less use of paper.  
 
4.1.2 The questionnaire 
Developing a good questionnaire is said to be a comprehensive task requiring appropriate 
consideration and evaluation of each question and when developing a questionnaire, it is 
important not to have leading questions, have clear formulations, and most important; having 
questions that measure what is of importance for the study (Bryman, 2004).  
 
The questionnaire was tested on neighbors and friends before it was published to assess 
whether it was valid (measuring what it is supposed to measure), whether the questions were 
understandable and clear and to avoid having repetitive questions. 
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The questionnaire has 35 questions, which can be divided into 6 sub sections.  
Part 1. System knowledge and level of sorting 
Part 2. Questions on motivation 
Part 3. General attitudes 
Part 4. Alternative regimes 
Part 5. Socioeconomic variables 
Part 6. Other comments 
 
The questionnaire is developed together with PhD students Marit H. Heller and Marianne 
Aasen, who both are taking part in the larger project ‘Environmental Policy and Human 
Action’ (Envact).  The questions are, in addition, developed by gathering inspiration from 
earlier studies on the topic, by Berglund (2003) and Sannerød (2003).  
 
The first two parts of the questionnaire are most important regarding the topic in this study, 
and are therefore put first.  The reason for this is that some respondents may loose interest 
after answering half the questionnaire, and by having the most important questions first; they 
have a higher probability of being answered.  The questions asking for socioeconomic 
background are placed at the end.  This is so due to two reasons; respondents may not want to 
give this kind of information before they know what the survey is about (sensitivity issue), or 
respondents are tired of answering, and thus these are questions not requiring evaluation and 
consideration about which alternative to chose.  Some of the respondents did in fact not wish 
to give up their age.  The last section was intended for other comments and was open for all. 
Only a few, however, used this opportunity.  
 
4.1.3 Questions and available response alternatives 
The questions are developed to help answering my research questions.  The available 
responses are mostly given as close ended, but there are also a few questions with an open 
ending.  Advantages with using close-ended questions are that they are easily quantifiable and 
thus easy to use in a statistic analysis without needing to recode.  A disadvantage with close-
ended questions is the limitations for respondents’ personal meaning.  Open-ended questions, 
on the other hand, need to be coded if they are to be used in statistical analysis.  However, 
they may give more detailed answers compared to close-ended questions.  Another 
disadvantage is that open-ended questions may demand more effort from the respondent and 
therefore may result in non-response. 
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In the questionnaire we have made use of routing, which is a function guiding respondents 
filling certain criteria, further on to the next question of importance to them.  For example, 
respondents who answer ‘nothing’ on the question about level of waste sorted are routed 
around the question asking about level sorted of the various waste categories.  Using this 
function may prevent respondents to dropping out because they do not need to answer 
questions not applicable to them.  The limitation using this function is that some variables 
may contain too little data to be used in statistical analyses, however, in this study these 
questions are not of high relevance, but rather add some perspective to the topic. 
 
The response alternatives under the close-ended questions are presented with alternatives 
where the respondent is to pick one on scales from 1-4 with ‘do not know’ as the 5th.  In the 
questionnaire for this study we provided the respondents with an alternative for ‘do not know’ 
at the end of the scale.  Including ‘do not know’ into a question has been debated, and the 
argument is that by including it, respondents are not forced to “express views they do not 
really hold” (Bryman, 2004:156).  However, the use of the term is controversial as it may be 
easy to pick ‘do not know’ if one does not bother to think about the subject of matter, or if one 
becomes tired of answering the questions (Bryman, 2004).   
 
The ‘do not know’ alternatives were, where it was logical that it represented indifference 
towards the topic, recoded into a middle score.  For some other questions, ‘do not know’ is, if 
not providing information needed for this study, coded as a missing variable to be left out of 
the analysis together with non-responses.  
 
4.1.4 Sampling 
The questionnaire was published on Søre Sunnmøre waste company’s web site and the 
randomly selected respondents received an invitation letter via post mail.  They were 
encouraged to answering the questionnaire within eight days and by participating they would 
take part in the lottery of a gift-card.  The lottery was an attempt to increase the response rate, 
which tends to be rather low in web-based surveys (Bryman, 2004).  In addition, we called the 
local newspaper to ask if they could write an announcement and encouraging the invitees to 
participate, which they gladly did. 
 
After two weeks we called the respondent to ask them if they would take the time to 
participate in the survey.  We redid this after another two weeks to remind the ones who had 
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agreed to participate, but also to ask those who were not reachable the first time we called.  
By making use of the phone, the invitees had the ability to ask questions about the survey 
right away, as well as get guidance in logging into the questionnaire. 
  
4.1.5 Reliability and validity 
According to Bryman (2004:28), some of “the most prominent criteria for the evaluation of 
social research are reliability […] and validity”.  These are factors “concerned with the 
adequacy of measures” (p.29).  In this case this refers to the questions in the questionnaire and 
how well, or how consistent the questionnaire is helping us measure what we are really 
measuring (Holme and Solvang, 1986).  
 
The reliability of a study is depending on how the measurement of concepts is managed and 
then followed by the processing of data.  High reliability is the outcome if one has 
independent measures of a phenomenon giving approximately the same result.  To test for 
reliability, one may compare the results from independent surveys from a phenomenon 
(Bryman, 2004; Holme and Solvang, 1986).  A measure may be affected by random errors, 
and, hence, is more reliable the less random errors there are.  A random error could, for 
example, be misinterpretation of the wording of a question.  It is enough that only some 
respondents misinterpret, and this can be seen by the following equation: Xo=Xr+Xs+Xe 
(Gripsrud et al. 2004).   The equation tells us that the value we do observe (Xo) is equal to the 
real value (Xr) plus a systematic error (Xs) and a random error (Xe).  Maximal validity is equal 
to (Xo=Xr).  That is, the observed value is equal to real value.  If the measurement is 
completely reliable, random errors will be zero, (Xs=0), but this is seldom the case, because 
systematic errors are never equal to zero.  Hence, Gripsrud et al. (2004:119) hold “there are 
different degrees of reliability and validity in relation to surveys.” 
 
“Reliability is a necessary, but not a sufficient premise for validity” (Gripsrud et al. 
2004:118), and can be measured through stability over time and by internal consistence in the 
answers given.  The study’s validity is concerned about “how well one measure what one 
intends to measure” (p.72), and is dependent on whether what is being measured actually 
represents characteristics one wish to clarify through the research questions.  Bryman 
(2004:28) finds validity to be “concerned with the integrity of conclusions that are generated 
from a piece of research”, and points to the issue of whether “a measure that is devised of a 
concept really does reflect the concept that it was supposed to be denoting” (p.28).  Gripsrud 
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et al. (2004) calls this content validity, and find that using open questions in addition to closed 
ones are beneficial in this case because respondents are asked about other factors than the 
ones specified by the researcher.  Thereby, the method is closer to measure the whole domain 
of the theoretical concept.   
 
A further important characteristic of validity is construct validity, which is “concerned with 
the extent to which a particular measure relates to other measures consistent with theoretically 
derived hypotheses concerning the concepts that are being measured” (Carmines and Zeller, 
1979, quoted in Gripsrud et al. (2004:120)).  This definition is divided into two: convergent 
and discriminant validity.  Convergent validity is concerned with whether the indicators that 
are measuring the same theoretical variable are highly correlated, whereas discriminant 
validity is concerned with whether indicators measuring different theoretical variables have 
low or no correlation (Gripsrud et al., 2004). 
 
4.1.6 Sources of error/limitations 
When doing a survey like in this study, there may be several sources of errors.  For example, 
there may be errors related to the selection of respondents, participation in the survey, errors 
related to handling of the raw data material and so forth.  
 
For this survey it is possible that those with a certain meaning about the waste regime, attitude 
towards the subject or concern for the environment as well as people with a higher education 
are over-representative.  If the selection is biased, the results might not be representative to 
the population from which I drew my sample.  The respondents’ answers may also contribute 
as a source of error because they do not properly understand the questions, they are biased, or 
lastly, they answer what they believe is expected or wanted.  Further, they may not answer 
consequently on questions made to ask nearly the same.   
 
Because Ulstein was considering to changing the fee related to household waste, it was 
important to publish the survey before this eventually happened as this could have an effect 
on peoples’ perceptions of the regime.  This led the questionnaire to be developed pretty fast, 
which may have led to some limitations in the creation and wording of questions. 
 
In cases where a subgroup is more likely to answer, the result is a response bias.  In this study 
the use of a web-based survey has excluded people who lack technical knowledge and people 
Mona Trehjørningen.                                                                                                     Environmental policy and human action. 
 33 
who may not have access to computers of various reasons.  In addition, people lacking interest 
in the topic as well as people angry at the regime in the municipality may have refused to 
participate.  Self -reporting questionnaires also have the effect that the respondents wishing to 
appear consistent may be affecting answers by providing answers they think are compatible 
with social desirable views.  Lastly, the time of conducting the survey may have inflicted on 
the response rate as the survey was published late November, a time of the year when people 
often are busy.  
 
Moreover, when calling the ones who had not responded, it became evident that many were 
older people, who had no interest in participating in the survey or they lacked access to 
computers, as well as technical skills.  Some had in fact passed away the last month and some 
were residing in a nursery home.  Others were listed as individuals, but in fact represented a 
firm.  Evidently, a firm cannot represent a household, and therefore was excluded from the 
list.  There is also another problem with calling people by phone; many of the younger only 
has a cell phone, which either is not listed in the phonebook or is registered on one of the 
parents.  This made it harder to reach them because I had to try several numbers to reach the 
right person.  Others were not even listed, due to reservation or other causes and could not be 
reached at all.  Finally, when talking to some from the list, they had not received the invitation 
letter at all and had to be given the opportunity and invitation by phone.  
 
4.2 Statistical analyses used to analyze the information. 
To analyze the information and find relations between variables, various statistical methods 
are utilized. 
 
4.2.1 Cronbach’s alpha 
This technique is used to measure internal consistency by estimating the reliability coefficient 
and thereby also getting indications of the correlation between the items and how closely they 
are related.  It is further a measure of an underlying construct, which can be followed by a 
factor analysis to study dimensionality of scale (Holme and Solvang, 1986).  
 
4.2.2 Confidence interval 
Confidence interval is an interval estimate of a parameter and an interval is given that is likely 
to include an unknown parameter.  Assuming normal distribution, the confidence level is 
determining how likely the parameter is contained.  Using a 95% level, 95% of the intervals 
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will include the unknown parameter, and the width gives an indication of the uncertainty 
about the parameter.  Hence, a confidence interval also indicates the reliability of an estimate 
(Howitt and Cramer, 2003). 
 
4.2.3 Factor analysis 
According to Howitt and Cramer (2003:209) “factor analysis is commonly used when trying 
to understand the pattern of responses of people completing closed-ended questionnaires.  The 
items measuring similar things can be identified through factor analysis”.  The analysis can be 
used when trying to analyze interrelationships between a large numbers of variables and to 
explain these variables in terms of their common underlying dimensions.  Highly correlated 
measures most probably are influenced by the same factors, and hence, helps uncover latent 
structures.  The goal is to being able to explain most of the observed correlation using the 
explaining latent variables found (Eikemo and Clausen, 2007). 
 
4.2.4 Regression 
Regression analysis is a statistical method used to assess the connection between one or more 
independent variables (X1, X2, X3,…..,Xn) and a dependent variable (Y), and especially how 
variation in the independent variables can explain variation in the dependent one.  “The 
limitation with regression is that it is only possible to test whether possible connections are 
significant different from zero, and not prove any causal relationships” (Holme and Solvang, 
1986:264).  Ordinal logistic regression is a method that is used when the dependent variable is 
ordinal, that is, its values can be ranked and counted/ordered, but not measured.  In ordinal 
logistic regression one assumes that the effect of the independent variables is equal for each 
level of the dependent variable.  This is tested by the test of parallel lines, which has to be non 
significant.  What is predicted in this type of analysis is a transformation of the raw value of 
the dependent variable.  
 
4.2.5 Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity occurs when some of the independent variables used in the regression model 
are correlated with each other and contributes redundant information because one variable’s 
contribution in the model is overlapping with another variable’s contribution.  The 
phenomenon in itself is not uncommon, but it may cause to problems if it is too high as the 
regression results may be misleading or confusing.  If variables are correlated at .8 or above, 
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they should be investigated further.  Multicollinearity above 30 should be looked into as this 
level can represent a problem. 
 
 
5. Results and data analysis  
5.1 Response rate 
The response rate after two rounds of remarking the non-responding respondents is 42%, 
which according to Magione quoted in Bryman (2004:135) “is not acceptable”.  With such a 
low response rate, questions can be asked about the representativeness of the sample.  I realize 
the limited ability to generalize from this sample, and care is necessary concerning 
interpretation of the results.  I now present the data that represent my independent variables. 
 
5.2 Who has responded? 
Even in a random selection of respondents, it is difficult to get a completely representative 
selection of the real distribution of the population.  Below is the distribution of males and 
females shown followed by tables showing socioeconomic variables. 
 
Table 1. Gender distribution.  
Gender My sample 
Møre & 
Romsdal     Norway 
Male 66 % 50.4% 49.9% 
Female 32.5% 49.6% 49.9% 
Sources: the questionnaire and SSB2 (2010). 
 
From the figure, the share of males is very large in my sample compared to Møre and 
Romsdal and the country on average.  Even though there is an overweight of males in Ulstein 
(Garshol, 2010), my sample has clearly an underrepresentation of females.  This can be so 
because the list from which the respondents randomly were drawn consists of names of the 
ones in the household responsible for the subscription to the renovation services.  Often the 
ones responsible for certain administrative services in the homes are males.  Additionally, if 
both names are on the list, the name of the male usually is listed first.  In addition, I cannot be 
sure who in the household has responded as the wife could answer in the man’s name.   
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Table 2.  Age level.  
Age My sample 
Møre & 
Romsdal Norway 
16 - 39 18.8% 37.4%* 39.9%* 
40 - 66 67.5% 44.7%* 43.9%* 
67 - 12.2% 18%* 16%* 
(*Given that the population above 16 is the whole population when summing to get 100%) 
Sources: the questionnaire and SSB3 (2010)  
 
According to the age distribution in Møre and Romsdal and in Norway, I have an 
underrepresentation of respondents in age level 1, 16-39.  Possible reasons for this could be 
that young people live with their parents until they pass the age of 20, many live together with 
friends, or they go away for studying.  There were 3 respondents who missed to give up their 
age in the questionnaire. 
 
Table 3.  Education level.  
Education 
My 
sample 
Møre & 
Romsdal Norway 
Primary/Secondary School 11.7% 30.4% 28.6% 
High School 18.3% 45.5% 41.3% 
Technical School 21.8% No data No data 
Academy/University 43.7% 20.8% 25.5% 
Other 3 % 3.4% 4.6% 
Sources: the questionnaire and SSB4 (2010)                               
 
The education level in my selection is high compared to Møre and Romsdal and the rest of the 
country.  43.7% has a university degree.  21.8% has technical school, which is also a high 
education.  Compared with numbers from Møre and Romsdal and the rest of the country, I 
have an overrepresentation of well-educated people in my sample and an underrepresentation 
of people with lower education.  The high level of well-educated people could be affecting the 
income level in my sample, which is presented next.  
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Table 4.  Households’ income level.  
Income level (before 
tax)   My sample 
Income level (after 
tax) Ulstein 
Møre & 
Romsdal Norway 
   < 150 000 0.5%   < 150 000 15.9% 19.5% 19.4% 
 150 000 - 400 000 20.3% 150 000 - 399 999 45.2% 48.8% 50.1% 
 400 001 - 650 000 26.4% 400 000 - 499 999 18.9% 15.9% 14.5% 
 650 001 - 800 000 22.3%  > 500 000  20 % 15.8% 16 % 
800 001 - 1 000 000 17.3%         
     > 1 000 000 10.2%         
SSB5 (2010) (In the questionnaire respondents are asked about the household’s income level before taxes, 
therefore my sample presents income before tax, Statistics Norway, however, only provides income levels after 
taxes are paid.) 
 
In the table presenting my sample, only 0.5% has less than 150 000 NOK/year in total 
income, whereas 27.5% has 800 001 NOK or above.  That means I have an 
underrepresentation of low-income households in my study.  In the figure presenting Ulstein, 
Møre and Romsdal and Norway, income levels are only provided after taxes, however, when 
subtracting approximately 50% tax from the highest income group, it is evident that people in 
Ulstein, 20%, has 500 000 NOK or above after taxes.  Compared to Møre and Romsdal and 
the rest of the country, this is rather high, implying that many in Ulstein have well paid work 
and hence, high income.  
 
Possibility to perform the action, sorting, is depending on what kind of housing facility the 
household posits.  Houses are often larger than apartments, and hence, people living in houses 
often have more space in the kitchen to install sorting facilities, which simplifies their sorting 
of household waste.  Table 5 shows the distribution of housing facilities. 
Table 5.  Housing.  
Housing My sample Western Norway Norway 
House 90.9% 79 % 73 % 
Apartment 6.6% 21 % 24 % 
Other 1.5% 6 % 5 % 
Sources: the questionnaire and SSB6 (2010) 
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Most of the respondents live in houses, 90.9%, which seems to be a little above the average 
for Western Norway, and higher than in the rest of Norway.  Only 6.6% live in apartments, 
and hence, I have an underrepresentation of people living in apartments.  On the other hand, 
the area where I did my selection is rather rural with a small city-center, which may explain 
the high percentage living in houses.  Also, 79.2% of my respondents are above 40 years, 
which implies that many have settled down with their family, and either bought or built a 
house.  This may have had an effect on Table 6 as well, as 87.8% states they are 2 or more 
persons in the household.  In Møre and Romsdal the number is 85.9% and in Norway 83.6%.  
There seems to be a small underrepresentation of single person households in my sample, this 
may, however be connected to the underrepresentation of young people, age category 1, as 
shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 6. Number of persons in household.  
Pers. in 
household My sample 
Møre & 
Romsdal Norway 
1 11.2% 14.2% 16.5% 
2 36.5% 22.2% 23.9% 
3 18.6% 17.9% 18 % 
4 or more 32.5% 45.8% 41.7% 
Sources: the questionnaire and SSB7 (2010) 
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 5.3 Level of waste sorting 
To gather information about the level of waste sorting, the respondents were asked to state 
how much of their household waste is sorted.  They were asked on a general basis.  Figure 5 
show how the respondents have answered regarding their level of sorting. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.  Sorting level (5:”How large share of your household waste is sorted”?) 
 
We see that 11.7% sort everything, and 39.8% states they sort most of their household waste.  
This gives us 51.5% stating they have a high sorting level.  20.4% are sorting pretty much and 
the rest, 28.1% has a rather low level of waste sorting.  One respondent states that he or she 
does not sort anything at all.  In addition to this, we asked how much of the different waste 
categories they actually sort.  This can be seen in Figure 6.  
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Different waste categories 
 
Figure 6.  Waste categories (6:”How large shares of the different waste categories are sorted”?) 
 
Table 7.  Percent of share sorted in various waste categories.  
  Paper Plastic Organic Glass Metals Clothing 
Special 
waste Electronic 
Everything 56.9% 38.9% 12.0% 55.2% 34.6% 20.7% 37.3% 53.3% 
Mostly 37.9% 40.4% 9.4% 20.1% 28.3% 26.9% 27.5% 19.0% 
Pretty much 3.1% 6.2% 6.3% 6.2% 7.9% 13.0% 11.4% 8.2% 
Some 0.5% 6.2% 9.4% 8.2% 8.4% 11.4% 8.3% 6.2% 
A little 1.5% 5.2% 13.6% 4.1% 9.9% 9.3% 9.8% 6.2% 
Nothing 0.0% 3.1% 49.2% 6.2% 9.9% 17.1% 5.7% 5.6% 
Don't know           1.6%   1.5% 
 
From Figure 6, we see that 56.9% of the respondents are sorting everything of their paper, and 
37.9% are sorting most of their paper, which gives 94.8%, which is a relatively high level.  
Turning to plastic and, adding the two categories implying high level of sorting, there are 
79.3% who sort most or everything of their plastic. 
 
Sorting of organic waste requires some sort of compost facilities near the house.  49.2% are 
not sorting this type of waste at all.  Only 21.4% sort all or most of their organic waste.  From 
an open-ended question about organic waste, it became clear that many are smallholders 
holding animals and, hence, feed the animals the organic waste.  Others have answered that 
0	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organic waste makes good soil for their flowers, and thus, even though they are not sorting 
much of their organic waste, they do in fact sort a little, hence, 23% sort some or a little of 
their organic waste. 
 
Glass without refund and metals must be delivered at ‘return-points’ provided by the 
authorities or the responsible unit for renovation services in the municipality.  Often these 
points are placed in the front of gas stations, shopping malls and other gathering places.  
However, these kinds of waste need to be transported to these facilities.  75.3% states that 
they sort everything or most of their glass, and 62.9% of metals. 
 
Clothing/fabrics and electronic waste also require other ways of delivery/disposal.  Clothing 
are collected by aid-organizations placing containers around the town whereas electronic 
waste need to be returned to the shops they were bought.  Both categories, however, have in 
common that they are not so often thrown away or replaced as the other categories.  47.6% 
state that they sort everything or most of their clothing.  This does not, however, include 
things that are broken because these cannot be reused and have no value for the aid 
organizations.  17.1% state that they sort nothing, which may be because they do not get rid of 
clothes before they are broken, and hence throw them in the household waste due to lack of 
other possibilities.  54.3% are sorting their electronic waste, which requires delivery at shops.  
Special waste is collected by the renovation service at certain pre given dates for the 
household to gather their special waste and place it at the curbside.  64.8% states they are 
sorting everything or most of their special waste.  
 
To better see how and if the various waste categories are overlapping, I have calculated the 
categories’ confidence intervals.  A confidence interval is a method of using data from a 
sample to say something about the population from which the sample was drawn.  By 
calculating the confidence intervals of the categories in the question asking for level sorted of 
various waste categories, these gives an overview of how the categories are placed in relation 
to each other.  Table 8 shows the confidence intervals.  
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Table 8. Confidence intervals for various waste categories. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A confidence interval provides a range of values that are likely to contain the parameter for 
the population.  A 95% confidence interval cover 95% of the probability of observing a value 
outside the given area is less than 0.05, indicating that if many samples were collected and 
confidence intervals were computed for these, 95% would contain the true mean.  In this 
study, the confidence interval is used to check for differences between the categories, and 
from Table 8, we can clearly see that organic waste and clothing differs significantly from the 
other categories; there is no or little overlap.  
 
Since the regime was implemented in January 2009, and hence, is rather new, it is interesting 
to see whether households in Ulstein has adapted to it and are behaving in accordance with 
what was intended; increasing their sorting.  There exists no legal enforcement system that 
can control that the regime is complied with, but it is illegal to get rid of waste in public 
places, like for example forest areas, parks and so on, and if detected, non compliers may get 
a ticket.  Complying with the authorities’ waste management strategies, on the other hand, can 
be regarded as a norm due to the issue on how to treat common resources.  The new regime 
makes use of a differentiated fee to underline the importance of the waste issue, and in 
addition to increase incentives for complying.  Figure 7 is showing whether today’s system 
has affected peoples’ level of sorting. 
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Figure 7.  Today’s system (19:“How has today’s system affected your level of sorting”?) 
 
Considering the differentiated fee based on amount of household waste, the households stand 
free to choose their level of sorting, and accordingly, how much they must pay.  If one 
chooses to sort everything possible, the fee is lower than if sorting little or nothing.  After the 
introduction of the system, 48% states they have increased their level of sorting.  Only 1% 
appears to be sorting less, whereas 51% sort as before the regime was implemented.  
 
5.4 What motivates sorting? 
5.4.1 Motivation for sorting 
Motivation for performing an act can be based on different reasons.  In Figure 8 various 
statements, 1-9, were presented for the respondents, and for simplicity the mean value of the 
different factors of motivation were computed.  The highest score was 5, implying that the 
statement is interpreted as very correct, and the lowest score 1.  Do not know was recoded 
into 3 representing indifference.  Cronbach’s alpha was used to see how closely related the 
items were as a group, and >0.7 indicates a relatively high internal consistency.  See appendix 
II for statistical details. 
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Figure 8. Motivation (7:“What makes you sort your waste”?) 
 
Table 9. Percentage replies in different motivational categories. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not correct at all 17.5% 3.2% 14.2% 9.8% 6.0% 15.5% 1.1% 1.1% 4.8% 
A little correct 29.5% 9.0% 24.0% 13.0% 17.6% 23.5% 12.8% 9.1% 22.0% 
Quite correct 41.0% 46.6% 36.6% 40.8% 41.2% 28.3% 33.5% 42.2% 37.6% 
Very correct 10.4% 41.3% 24.6% 35.9% 34.1% 27.3% 52.1% 46.5% 33.9% 
Don't know 1.6%   0.5% 0.5% 1.1% 5.3% 0.5% 1.1% 1.6% 
 
As seen in Table 9 above, and when adding the percentage replies in the ‘quite correct’ and 
‘very correct’ categories, 51.4% state that encouragement from the authorities (1) to a large 
extent is motivating them.  17.5% is not considering this to be motivating at all.  87.9% are 
motivated by the ability of seeing themselves as responsible persons (2).  61.2% states the 
ability of being regarded as responsible persons by others motivates them (3).  76.7% get 
motivation by behaving in accordance with how they think others should behave (4).  75.3% 
are motivated to sort their waste because it gives them a good feeling (5) and, 55.6% because 
sorting is economically beneficial (6).  85.6% are motivated by a feeling of duty to contribute 
taking care of the environment (7) and, 88.7% think everybody should sort regardless of 
payoffs (8).  71.5% holds information about effects of sorting to be motivating (9).  
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Further, for this question, I used a factor analysis to reveal the latent dimensions of a set of 
variables by reducing attribute space from a larger number of variables to a smaller number of 
factors (Eikemo and Clausen, 2007).  The technique can be used to study the correlation 
structure of a set of variables, and further to examine factor loadings of indicator variables to 
determine if they are loading on latent variables as predicted.  Because factor analysis, 
according to Howitt and Cramer (2003:209), “includes a variety of techniques and approaches 
which may seem bewildering […] a standard approach will serve the purpose of most 
researchers well”.  I followed their guidelines in ‘A guide to computing statistics with SPSS 
for Windows’.  The questions in the questionnaire were structured to be covering both 
personal and social norms, and from the analysis, which is presented in greater detail below, I 
found a pattern that fits quite well to the theory.  The factor loadings are interpreted in light of 
this when constructing and naming the new variables.  
 
Table 10. Excerpt from factor analysis question 7, motivation. 
Rotated Component Matrixa 
Component 
 
Personal 
norms 
Social 
norms 
Encourege
ment from 
authorities 
Economic 
incentives 
I have a duty to sort my waste .852       
Everybody should sort their 
waste 
.801       
Warm glow .671 .367     
Information about effects .637  .407   
See myself as responsible .584 .515     
I should do what I want others 
to do 
  .856     
Other see me as responsible   .773     
Encouragement from 
authorities 
    .939   
Economic incentives       .967 
 
Table 10 is an excerpt from the factor analysis that shows how the various factors are 
distributed within the categories.  From the table, it is evident that personal norm is the factor 
with most loading variables followed by social norms.  Personal norms is an internal 
motivational factor, and when looking at the components loading at and constituting the new 
variable ‘personal norms’, we see that it is constituted by a feeling of duty to following a 
norm combined with a warm glow for undertaking the action, enhanced self-image as well as 
benefits of information.  The variable ‘social norms’ also consists of warm glow and self-
image in addition to a sense of duty for behaving in ways one wants others to behave and, 
image in others’ presence.  Respondents that are responsible both in relation to him or her self 
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as well as in relation to society should answer yes on these statements, and hence, the factors 
‘warm glow’ and ‘I see myself as responsible’, are loading on both personal norms and social 
norms, which is not unexpected.  ‘Encouragement from the authorities’ is mainly based on the 
component encouragement from authorities, but also has information about effects as a 
loading factor, however lower than under personal norms.  Lastly, ‘economic incentives’ is a 
variable only constituted by the component economic incentives and hence, is not sharing 
other components with any of the other factors.  These new factors are counting for 74% of 
the variance explained. 
 
Procedure for factor analysis 
When doing a factor analysis, one should according to the Kaiser criterion extract factors with 
an eigenvalue above 1.  Eigenvalues are the factors’ variance.  In addition to the rotated 
component matrix, a scree-plot graphs the eigenvalue against the factor number and gives an 
indication of how many factors are accounting for variance.  Since the Kaiser criterion is not a 
given cut-off value, I chose to extract 4 factors to avoid loosing too much information.  The 
scree-plot is presented below.  For more statistical details from the analysis, see appendix II. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Excerpt from factor analysis: Scree-plot. 
 
The first factor counts for most of the variance, 41%. The second counts for 12% whereas the 
last two for 11% and 10%.  The new factors created from the factor analysis were shown in 
Figure 10.   
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Figure 10.  Factors of motivation 
 
The new variable personal norms has the highest value with a mean score 3.9 of 5, 
encouragement from the authorities 2.8, economic incentives 3.1 and, lastly, social norms 3.0.  
 
5.4.2 Motivation for starting or increasing sorting 
We also asked the respondents to consider various factors that could motivate them to begin 
sorting if they did not sort at all, as well as to increase their current level of sorting.  Figure 11 
shows the replies for the different alternatives. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Motives for starting or increasing sorting (9:”What would make you sort or increase your sorting”?) 
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Table 11.  Percentage response 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Not correct at all 5.4% 41.1% 10.8% 32.2% 38.0% 
A little correct 20.4% 28.6% 35.5% 30.6% 16.6% 
Quite correct 31.7% 14.6% 31.2% 26.8% 16.0% 
Very correct 39.8% 8.6% 19.9% 7.1% 18.7% 
Don't know 2.7% 7.0% 2.7% 3.3% 10.7% 
 
Looking at Figure 11 and Table 11, 71.5% finds better infrastructure to have an important 
impact on sorting (1).  When considering the opportunity of increasing the differentiated fee 
(2), 23.2% would be motivated, whereas 41.1% states that this would not motivate them at all, 
51.1% finds information about the beneficial effects of sorting (3) to be a motivating factor 
and 33.9% find motivation in information about own level of sorting compared to other 
households (4).  38% are not motivated by a change in type of fee (5), whereas 34.7% say 
they are. 
 
An open ended question, asking about other factors that would make the respondent start 
sorting, or sort more than today, was filled out by 37 respondents.  48% of those responding 
hold improvements in the system in general as a motivating factor, 24% think more or better 
information about whether their contribution is actually beneficial, and 13.5% hold recycling 
itself as the main motivating factor.  Lastly, 5.4% states that economic benefit is of 
importance.   
 
5.5 What explain behavior? 
Below the framework is like presented in chapter 3.5.  Data on motivation and stated sorting 
level (behavior) has already been presented and now other motivational variables are added 
that may explain behavior. 
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Figure 12. Reproduced framework 
 
5.5.1 General environmental attitude 
Peoples’ attitudes and concern for the environment also may play a role regarding their 
willingness to sort waste.  When asking the respondents if they regard themselves as more 
environmentally concerned than the average, however, only 30.7% stated they did.  39.1% did 
not see themselves as more concerned than the average and, 30.2% did not know.  When 
asked about feelings of responsibility of contributing to solving the environmental problems, 
the attitudes can be seen in Figure 13. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. General environmental attitudes (17:“Consider the following statements”). 
 
31.9% think that environmental problems are the responsibility of the authorities, and 51.4% 
think this is quite correct.  Only 16.2% disagrees, implying that individuals do have a 
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responsibility as well.  60.9% do what they can if it is not perceived to be too costly, 30.2% 
finds this to be quite correct.  Only 8.9% have replied ‘not correct at all’, indicating that costs 
in time or money has little importance for their behavior.   64.9% find it very or quite correct 
that they have personal responsibility for contributing to solve the environmental issues.  
31.9% find this to be a little correct whereas 3.2% do not see it as their personal responsibility 
at all.  General environmental attitude is not represented in the framework, but could be 
included under knowledge.   
 
In addition to general environmental attitudes, how people perceive a regime may influence 
on their attitudes and, hence, motivation to act in accordance with the regime.  When asked 
about their attitude or perception of the regime, 65% are negative to the regime, 5,1% are 
neutral and, 21,3% are positive.  8,6% did not answer this.  Figure 14 illustrates attitude 
toward the waste regime. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Attitude toward the system (18:”Consider following statements”) 
 
5.5.2 Knowledge about the system 
Attitude toward the system may be related to knowledge about the system and how it works. 
Therefore it is of interest to see if the respondents know how the system actually works, 
because if a respondent believes there is a fee based solely on the weight of the waste, one 
should believe this would motivate him or her to sort more than if he or her had full system 
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knowledge and, hence, know that there is both a fixed fee and a differentiated fee.  Figure 15 
a) and b) show level of knowledge related to the system. 
 
 
Figure 15 a) System knowledge.                                                                 Figure 15 b) Fee knowledge. 
(3:”What kind of system…”)                                                                     (4:”Are you aware of the fee?”) 
 
Figure 15 a) shows that many of the respondents are aware of how the system is working.  
60.7% know that they pay a fixed fee plus a fee based on the weight of their household waste.  
28.1% believe that the fee is based solely on weight, whereas 11.2% posits no knowledge 
about the system at all.   
 
Figure 15 b) shows that 78.5% does not know how much they pay in fee a year, whereas 
21.5% are aware of how much they pay.  60.7% states they have full system knowledge.  Still, 
only 21.5% are aware of how much they pay.  According to neoclassical economic theory, 
individuals will seek the option that gives them most gain/utility, which in this case should be 
increased sorting level to reduce the fee.  And, especially those believing that the fee is based 
on weight only, should be sorting at a high level.   
 
Considering the impact of the economic incentive, the respondents were asked to imagine 
hypothetical changes in the differentiated fee.  When considering a hypothetical increase from 
2,24 NOK/kg to 5,00 NOK/kg, Figure16 give a good indication of how people state this 
would affect their behavior. 
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Figure 16. Sorting if fee is increased from 2,24 NOK to 5,00 NOK (26:”How would this affect your sorting?) 
 
If the differentiated fee were increased from 2,24 NOK to 5,00 NOK, only 26% would 
increase their sorting to some extent, whereas 54.1% would sort as before.  As seen in Table 
11, 23.2% claimed an increased differentiated fee would motivate them, and as seen here, 
26% state they would act in response to the incentive.   If the fee were decreased to 0,50 
NOK, on the other hand, as showed in Figure 17, 10.2% would increase their sorting.  76.5% 
would be sorting, as before, which is 22.4% more than if the fee was increased, and 7.7% 
would sort less.  Clearly, the 10.2% who would increase are not satisfied with the fee system, 
whereas those who would decrease are acting according to the price mechanism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17. Sorting if fee is decreased from 2,24 NOK to 0,50 NOK (27:”How would this affect your sorting?) 
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5.5.3 Institutions. 
The most important institution in this study is the waste regime.  I have no data on the regime 
except for self-reported data on changed behavior.  In the analysis, therefore, institutions are 
not fully covered, as it is mainly constant.  Other institutions are present, however, and social 
processes in the local community or neighborhood can affect people’s behavior.  For example, 
if there exists strong norms in the neighborhood regarding how to behave in relation to sorting 
of waste, or other matters, this may influence the respondents’ behavior.  When asked to 
consider statements about how perceived social norms in the neighborhood are affecting 
them, the respondents gave answers represented in the following figure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18. Perceived social norms in the neighborhood (15:”Consider following statements”) 
 
From Figure 18, households in Ulstein do not seem to be interacting much regarding the issue 
of waste sorting.  Only the variable ‘I talk to my neighbors….’ has got a fairly high response 
on the alternative ‘a little correct’.  A factor analysis gave only one factor, which is included 
as neighborhood institutions in later analyses. 
 
5.5.4 Habits 
Although there may be many factors contributing to motivating people to act in certain ways, 
behavior may be based on routine, which leads us to take into consideration the effects of 
habits.  Habits are, like presented in earlier chapters, routinized behavior based on automacy, 
and which are not demanding thoughtful consideration.  Since sorting of waste is a type of 
behavior that is carried out  at least on a weekly basis in a household, it may have become 
routinized behavior carried out without consideration of the actual or original reasons for 
performing.  When asking the respondents whether they are sorting their waste automatically, 
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by having them to consider whether they are sorting their waste without reflecting over the 
act, we got answers represented in Figure 19.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19.  Habits (11:” I sort my waste without reflecting over the act”) 
 
27% of those responding sort their waste automatically (very correct) and 50% states it is 
quite correct that sorting is carried out automatically.  This gives 77%, who routineously and 
not consciously are sorting their waste.  20.4% finds it a little correct that sorting of waste is a 
habit, whereas 2.6% do not agree, and hence, must find sorting to be an action requiring 
reflection. 
 
5.5.5 Cognitive dissonance 
Cognitive dissonance represents a state where one knows what is the right thing to do, but if 
not doing the right thing and instead is working with the other cognition to make the act less 
ridiculous, the dissonance related to not performing the act is reduced.  Figure 20 shows some 
factors that may contribute to dissonance and, hence, also may affect sorting.  
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Figure 20. Cognitive dissonance (13:”I do not sort my waste because…”) 
 
30% of the respondents have replied they do not sort all they potentially can, and some of the 
reasons they do not do this are showed in Figure 20.  86.8% finds that the infrastructure is not 
good enough.  76.7% think sorting is too time consuming.  61.1% do not think that sorting of 
household waste contributes enough to solving the environmental problems, and lastly, 18.3% 
are not sorting all that they can because they believe that others are not sorting. 
 
In addition to the above-mentioned variables that may work as to explain behavior, various 
socioeconomic factors, like presented in the first part of this chapter, may also influence 
behavior, and are included in further analyses. 
 
5.6 Explaining variation in behavior 
Now I will be looking at what factors may explain behavior.  The framework represented in 
section 3.5.1 is representing the variables that I have assumed to influence on behavior, and 
will be used to explain this.  
 
5.6.1 What explain variation in behavior?  
To investigate what explains behavior, I did an ordinal logistic regression.  This kind of 
regression is used when the dependent variable is ordinal and one assumes that the effect of 
all the independent variables is the same for each level of the dependent.  The purpose of the 
analysis is to study what explains behavior by looking at the impact of the independent 
variables on the dependent one (Garson, 2009).  
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Procedure for ordinal logistic regression analysis 
To control for multicollinearity, I did a bivariate correlation to see whether some of the 
independent variables were highly correlated.  As a rule of thumb, values above 0.8 are worth 
investigating closer.  I had values above 0.7 but below 0.8, however, this too suggested a 
rather high correlation.  Two of the factors I got from the factor analysis were highly 
correlated (above 0.7), and to control for this in the regression, I removed the variables 
loading on more than one factor to avoid high correlations.  Running a new correlation 
showed decreased values of correlation between these factors after this operation.  Also, 
because there is not the same possibility of evaluating multicollinearity in ordinal regression, I 
did stepwise linear regressions to take a look at the multicollinearity statistics.  This will, 
according to Eikemo and Clausen (2007:127), “work because the dependent variable is not 
included in the multicollinearity”.  The consequence of multicollinearity is that the estimated 
impact of a variable on the dependent variable tends to be less precise than would have been 
the case if there were no correlation.  
 
To improve model fit I ran the ordinal logistic regression several times, dropping an 
insignificant variable at each step.  By removing insignificant variables, the relationship 
between those left in the model may alter (Garson, 2009).  I dropped the least significant 
variable at each step, and stopped when there was no reason to remove another variable as the 
significance level of those left did not improve.  
 
N increased by 25 (from step one to step eleven) when removing insignificant variables, 
indicating that all respondents had not replied completely on all the questions.  Because of 
this, the regression models may not be compared directly.  The least significant variables may 
in fact have been correlated with some of the other independent variables, and therefore, when 
removing one, the other may improve as the covariance has been removed.  They may, in 
addition, be insignificant because low or no explanatory power on the variance of the 
dependent variable.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mona Trehjørningen.                                                                                                     Environmental policy and human action. 
 57 
Table 12. Ordinal logistic regression with stated behavior as dependent variable*.  
 
The hypotheses that were presented in chapter 3.5 regarding stated behavior, related to sorting 
of waste, are presented again in the following section and answered basing the results on the 
ordinal logistic regression analysis.  The significant findings are presented followed by the 
hypotheses that have been refuted. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Respondents living in houses sort more than respondents living in apartments. 
 
For a dichotomous variable like housing type where level 1, representing respondents living 
in house, is estimated and level 2 (apartment) is the reference category in the analysis, a 
positive coefficient means that the category coded 1 (house) is more likely to have higher 
scores on the ordinal dependent (than the category coded 2, if significant).  The coefficient of 
1.171 indicates that respondents living in houses are associated with higher values on level of 
                                                
• Interpretation of reported abbreviations. N = the number of valid observations. LR Chi2 =the likelihood ratio that at 
least one of the predictors' regression coefficient is not = 0 in the model. Pseudo R2 =measure of model effect size, 
the higher the better. TPL = test of parallel lines. This should be non significant, and the categories in the model 
can be combined until parallelism is achieved. 
Independent variables
Parameter estimates 
(coeffisients) P value
Parameter estimates 
(coeffisients) P value
Economic incentives .355 .002 .390 .000
Encouragesment from the authorities .073 .562
Social norms  -.075 .638
Personal norms .499 .013 .522 .002
Gender .099 .778
Age level .216 .464 .438 .060
Income  -.396 .154
Education  -.170 .518
No in household .506 .084 .391 .092
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System knowledge .068 .770
Environmental concern  -.049 .819
Fee knowledge .072 .849
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sorting (behavior) than those living in apartments.  The hypothesis is significant on a 10% 
level with p= .057. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Respondents who are sorting their waste habitually have a high level of 
sorting. 
 
There is clearly a significant relationship between habits and behavior.  From the model we 
see that both in the first, as well as in the eleventh step, the variable habits is significant, and 
hence, for one unit’s increase in habit, we would expect a 0.8 (.836) increase in the log 
ordered odds of being in a higher level of stated level of sorting (behavior) in the first step of 
the regression and a similar increase in the eleventh step (.767), given that all other variables 
are held constant.  Exponentiation of the log ordered odds (eexp) gives the odds ratio (2.3 first 
step and 2.2 eleventh step), which may be easier to interpret.  Hence, for one unit’s change in 
the variable habit, the odds ratio for respondents being in a higher level of the dependent 
variable, stated level of sorting, are 2.2.  The hypothesis stating that respondents who sort 
habitually have a higher level of sorting is accepted at a 1% level, with p =. 000. 
 
Hypothesis 6a: Holding a personal norm concerning sorting of waste results in increased 
sorting. 
 
Personal norms have positive coefficients and is just not significant at a 1% level in the first 
model (p=. 013), but becomes significant at the 1% level in the second model with p=. 002.  
We can see that for a unit increase in personal norms would give a 0.5 (.499 in 1st step and 
.522 in 11th step) increase in the log ordered odds (or 1.7 in odds ratio) of being in a higher 
level of stated behavior, sorting level, given that other variables were held constant.  The 
hypothesis is confirmed/accepted.  
Hypothesis 6b: The economic incentive motivates to increased sorting. 
 
Economic incentives are in both models significant at the 5% level, and in the last model at 
1% level with p=. 002 (first step) and p=. 000 (eleventh step), and the hypothesis stating that 
the economic incentive is affecting behavior is accepted.  For one unit increase in economic 
incentive, there would be a 0.4 increase in the ordered log odds or 1.5 in odds ratio of being in 
a higher level of sorting behavior if other variables were constant. 
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Hypothesis 2: Neighborhood institutions in the form of perceived neighborhood norms 
influence on behavior. 
 
From the model there is no significant relationship between neighborhood institutions and 
behavior.  Hence, I cannot say that neighborhood institutions influence on behavior in my 
study. 
 
Hypothesis 4a: System knowledge increases the level of sorting. 
 
There is no significant value for system knowledge in the model, and the variable system 
knowledge cannot be used to explain behavior. 
 
Hypothesis 4b: Attitude to the system is related to sorting 
 
There is no significant value for attitude to the system, and hence, the hypothesis has been 
refuted. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Environmental concern has a positive effect on sorting. 
 
Environmental concern has a positive coefficient but is not significant.  The hypothesis is not 
accepted in this study. 
 
Hypothesis 6c: Acknowledging a social norm concerning sorting of waste results in increased 
sorting.  
 
The model does not give any significant values for this hypothesis in the first step and it is not 
accepted.  The coefficient is negative, indicating that a unit increase in social norms we would 
expect a -0.1 (-.075) decrease in the ordered log odds, or 0.9 in odds ratio, of being in a higher 
level of stated behavior, given all other variables were held constant.  Looking at the 
correlation between stated behavior and social norms, on the other hand, it is .230**, and 
hence, there is a relationship between the variables.  The correlation matrix is presented in 
appendix II.  
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Hypothesis 6d: Encouragement from the authorities increases the sorting level. 
 
Encouragement from the authorities is not significant in the model and cannot explain sorting 
level.  It has positive coefficient in the first step, which indicates an increase in the likelihood 
(ordered log odds) of being in a higher level if it had been significant. 
 
 
5.7 Can any of the variables explaining behavior also explain the differences in the level 
sorted of various waste categories? 
To assess this question, I ran separate ordinal logistic regressions for the sorting of each of the 
different waste categories.  I used a model with the same independent variables as used in the 
previous regression.  For each model, I ran several steps to find the best model fit.  Hence, all 
variables have a 1st step but different last steps.  Therefore, comparison is difficult.  Table 13 
on next page presents the last step-models.  The complete model with both steps is included in 
appendix II. 
 
For this analysis it is important to keep in mind that the questions are asked on a general basis, 
and hence, when trying to get more specific results by holding each of the different waste 
categories as the variable to be explained (dependent) by the independent variables, the results 
may differ from the analysis trying to explain behavior on a general basis since the questions 
are formed to be answered on this basis.  
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Holding sorting of paper as the dependent variable to be explained by the independent 
variables, step 1 gives 4 significant variables: social norms, personal norms, system 
knowledge and, neighborhood institutions.  Improving the model fit, only 2 explanatory 
variables were left: personal norms, significant at a 1% level (p =. 005) and neighborhood 
institutions at a 5% level (p = .011).  Hence, there is a 99% probability that there is a 
connection between personal norms and sorting of paper.  Institutions in the neighborhood 
have less explanatory effect as it is only significant on a 5% level, and thus, there is a 5% 
probability of not existing a relationship. 
 
For sorting of plastic, the best model gave 5 significant variables: social norms, personal 
norms, number of people in the household, habits and lastly, institutions.  The variable 
institutions is significant on a 1% level (p =. 002), habits and number of people in the 
household at 5% level (p =. 012 and p =. 011), and social norms and personal norms at a 10% 
level (p =. 082 and p =. 069).  Hence, there is 99% chance for institutions, 95% for habits and 
number of people in household, and 90% for social and personal norms to have a connection 
with level of plastic sorting. 
 
For sorting of glass without refund, the best model gave the variables personal norms and 
neighborhood institutions at respectively 1% (p =. 001, p=. 002) and gender and fee 
knowledge at 5% level (p = .013, p = .057).  Gender 1 (male) has a positive coefficient, .405, 
which indicates that males are more likely to have higher scores on glass than females (odd 
ratio = 1.5).  
 
For sorting of organic waste, the best model gave economic incentives and attitudes to the 
regime as significant explanatory variables at 1% level (p = .000, p = .007), and personal 
norms at 5% level (p = .046), and at 10% level housing type 1, house, (p = .073).  
 
For metal, almost all the independent variables are significant at some level, except habits, 
attitude towards the regime, system knowledge, environmental concern and education.  At 1% 
level, encouragement from the authorities (p = .004), social norms (p = .010), age level (p = 
.005), number of people in the household (p = .000), and housing type (p = .007).  At a 5% 
level: personal norms (p = .016) and gender (p = .013).  Lastly, at 10% level: economic 
incentives (p = .076). 
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For clothing, at 1% level, social norms (p = .001), fee knowledge (p = .007), number of 
people in the household (p = .000) and age level (p = .011) is significant.  At a 10% level: 
encouragement from the authorities is significant (p = .094). 
 
For the category special waste, economic incentives is significant at 1% level (p = .010). 
Personal norms at 5% level (p = .049) and at 10% level: age level (p = .072), housing type (p 
= .072) and attitude towards the regime (p = .092). 
 
Lastly, for sorting of special waste: at 1% level personal norms (p = .005) together with age 
level (p = .001), followed by 5% level: economic incentives (p =. 015), income (p =. 014), 
and number of people in the household (p = .014).  The variable habit is significant at 10% 
level (p = .089). 
  
We see that ‘personal norms’ is present as an explaining variable in nearly all categories, 
followed by institutions in the neighborhood, which, on the other hand, did not come out as a 
significant variable for explaining behavior on a general level.  The other variables are, as we 
can see from Table 13, scattered around as explaining variables for the various waste 
categories.  Also worth noticing is that ‘habits’, which is a significant variable explaining 
behavior at the general level, is not significant as an explaining variable for any of the 
categories except for plastic and electronic waste, at a 5% and 10% level. 
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6. Discussion 
I will now discuss to what extent the findings from the analyses in chapter 5 answers the 
research questions proposed for this study.  I will, moreover, discuss the findings by using the 
theoretical perspectives presented in the theory part. 
 
In this study I have addressed households and asked individuals to give answers based on the 
household as a unit, not distinguishing between single and multiple persons units.  A 
household, as defined by Hook and Paolucci (1970, in Åberg, 2000:3), is “a corporate unit of 
interacting and interdependent personalities who have common themes and goals, have 
commitment over time and shares resources and living space”.  This definition, however, do 
not include single-person households, and Åberg (2000:3) states that single-person 
households have an increased resource use as they do not share the resource within the 
household.  Further, she argues “single-person households may represent differences in life-
styles with consequences for resource use and waste production”.  In my study, I do not 
differentiate between various types of households, since I have a random sample. 
 
6.1 Level of waste sorting in Ulstein. 
6.1.1 The level of waste sorting under a regime using monetary incentives. 
The level of waste sorting was presented in chapter 5.3.  I will now discuss the differences in 
the level sorted of the various waste categories.  Due to limitations in data, this section will 
contain interpretation of reasons behind why the levels are as they are.   
 
Keeping Figure 6 in mind will help underline the differences between the categories.  There 
were three categories that had very high levels of sorting: paper, glass without refund and 
electronic waste.  One category had a substantial level of no sorting: organic waste, whereas 
the other categories did not point out any extremes in the various sorting levels. 
 
The waste system in Ulstein has arrangements for picking up paper, which has its own bin 
that the households can place beside the bin for household waste.  Hence, the availability for 
sorting of paper is well organized and it does not require much extra effort from the 
respondents.  Paper is, additionally, the largest waste category for sorting, which may have 
led to the establishing of a routine for sorting this waste category.   
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Glass without refund also has a high sorting level; ‘everything’, with only 1.7% less than 
paper, however, lower values in the other sorting levels.  This kind of waste has to be washed 
before dropped off at return points placed around in the local area, and hence require some 
extra effort.  Electronic waste also has a high level for ‘everything’.  A reason for this may be 
that since electronic waste is not something one gets rid of every week, one undertakes the 
extra effort and brings it to a store for drop off. 
 
Organic waste is the category where most respondents have stated they sort nothing.  There is 
no organized system for sorting of organic waste, even if it is a well-known resource for 
recycling.  Because my sample is drawn from a village, a few of the respondents have stated 
they feed their farm animals.  Beside that, there is not much sorting of organic waste although 
above 90% of the respondents are living in houses, and to increase the sorting level, 
organization of composting facilities or the like is necessary to arrange for by the 
municipality. 
 
Sorting of plastic is 15.5% lower than for paper when adding the ‘everything and mostly’ 
category.  This may have something to do with the effort the respondents have to undertake 
when sorting plastic, as there is no additional bin for this category.  Instead the respondents 
have to use clear plastic bags, which are placed on the curbside, beside the bin for household 
waste, for collection.  In addition, the plastic has to be clean, and there are rules for what can 
and cannot be categorized as plastic waste for recycling.  Hence, there is some extra effort 
required to sorting plastic, which may be an explanation of why the sorting level for plastic is 
not as high as the level for paper.  Another explanatory factor worth mentioning is that there 
has been some uncertainty regarding the usefulness of sorting plastic.  In the questionnaire 
there were left some space open for ‘other comments’.  Many of those utilizing this 
opportunity for adding their views on the system, expressed uncertainty regarding if there was 
any point sorting plastic as this had been transported and processed together with the 
household waste; burned.  Some also expressed anger with the regime due to this, and saw no 
point in putting effort into sorting their plastic when it was burned after all.   
 
Sorting of metal is not high either, and beside organic waste and clothing/fabric, metal has 
most replies in the ‘nothing’ category with above 9%.  A reason for this may clearly be that 
the respondents need to bring the waste to a return point, as there are usually containers both 
for glass and metal waste in the same area.  On the waste company’s web pages, however, 
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there is no information about how or where to sort metal waste, and thus it might be thrown 
into the household waste due to lack of information.  
 
Clothes and fabric is a type of waste collected through special containers, mainly organized 
through some kind of aid organization.  These are placed around the municipality, however 
not so plentiful as the containers for glass and metal.  According to my sample, this category 
has not a high level of sorting.  This may be due to the fact that people does not that often 
throw away old clothes, maybe they are given to relatives of friends, or like a respondent 
stated per telephone: “We are ‘sunnmøringer’, we don’t get rid of anything of value!” (A 
respondent who had not received the invitation letter, but who agreed on answering the 
questions via telephone). 
 
The last waste category is represented by special waste.  This is a category including 
hazardous components like oil, paint, old batteries and so on.  There have the last decade been 
launched information campaigns of the environmentally damaging effects of throwing 
components from this category into nature, and the waste company is obliged to establish a 
system for collection of special waste.  In Ulstein the households are equipped with a box for 
special waste, which they can place at the curbside, but larger quantities need to be brought to 
the local waste deposit by the households themselves.  In addition, containers made for 
receiving special waste are placed at certain areas.  Hence, sorting of special waste requires 
some effort.  
  
6.1.2 The level of sorting after the introduction of today’s regime in Ulstein. 
By introducing the regime, which was done in January 2009, households were given an 
economic incentive to increase their level of sorting and, thereby acting in a socially desirable 
way, contributing to a cleaner environment.  From the self-reporting questionnaire, and as 
shown in Figure 7, nearly half of the respondents states they have increased their sorting level 
due to the implementation of the new regime.  When using a bivariate correlation, we got a 
significant positive correlation between economic incentives and today’s system (.286**), so 
clearly there is a relationship.  Accordingly, there is a positive association, and there has been 
an increase, however, due to what reason, whether the economic incentive or the underlining 
of the importance behind sorting through using an incentive, is uncertain.  Unfortunately I 
have no data on sorting levels in 2008, so comparison of levels is not possible. 
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According to Thøgersen (2003:197), “the rationale of regulation by means of economic 
incentives is to change the relative costs and benefits of environmentally desirable behavior in 
order to make it more profitable for the individual to behave in accordance with the collective 
interest”.  From my sample, I see that by introducing the regime, there has been an increase in 
the sorting level of the respondents, and hence one may say that it has served some of its 
purpose; increasing sorting levels.   
 
Nevertheless, introducing a system utilizing market instruments to promoting a norm based 
behavior can be perceived negatively, and the largest share of my respondents states they are 
negative to the system.  When or if the users of a system disagree with it due to various 
reasons, they may choose to deviate from it.  This could for example be opposition through 
illegal dumping.  Research has shown that resentment is an outcome when individuals feel 
constrained in relation to their behavioral freedom, and Berkowitz (1970:146) argues, 
“whenever we are confronted with a call for help or only a felt obligation to aid someone, we 
are faced with a bothersome loss of our freedom”.  Brehm (1966, in Berkowitz, 1970:146) 
agrees to this finding and adds; “psychological reactance arises when the individual faces a 
possible restriction on his or her behavioral freedom […], which further leads to hostility as 
well as an increased desire to do whatever the individual believes he or she may not be able to 
do”.   
 
When people feel constrained because the intervening force is perceived as too controlling 
and perhaps depressing self-determination, an opposite effect of what was intended may 
prevail.  Pricing may reduce the effect of intrinsic motivation because morals and ethics are 
depressed by the intervention, thus replacing intrinsic motivation with a more rationalistic and 
economic point of departure (Frey, 1997).  In addition to this, “the application of external 
interventions does not only crowd out intrinsic motivation in the specific area, but spreads 
beyond” (Frey, 1997:35).  In many situations, “payment is not found to be adequate because 
supply is considered a moral obligation, and problems appear when the incentive mechanism 
used does not conform well to the logic of the concrete situation as perceived by the 
respondents” (Vatn, 2005:156). 
 
Ackerman (1997:31) claims;” people do not respond very much to moderate prices for 
garbage collection.  The initial introduction of unit pricing causes a modest reduction in waste 
disposal; small price changes thereafter have almost no additional effect, while big price 
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incentives might lead to unacceptable levels of illegal dumping”.  Illegal dumping, burning of 
waste or other kinds of deviation from the system, nevertheless, does not appear to be a 
problem according to my survey.  Totally 42 respondents stated deviations from the regime 
and mostly explains this with feeding of farm animals or absent-mindedness in relation to 
throwing household waste into other waste categories.  Of those 42 respondents, 21.4% states 
they are deviating from the system because this decreases their payments.  Nevertheless, 
because this was a question most respondents were routed around, I do not have enough data 
to include this into any statistical analysis, and I cannot generalize from the findings.  It on the 
other hand, something that should be kept in mind when designing policies of this kind. 
 
6.2 What motivates sorting of household waste?  
In the theory part of this paper, I presented different perspectives for explaining behavior. 
Behavior can be regarded as a result of action based on motivation, motivation as the means 
and, socially desirable behavior as the end for the ‘we-oriented’ individual and personally 
desirable behavior for the individual pursuing his or her own interests, the ‘I-rational’.  Like 
shown in chapter 5.4, by using a factor analysis to see where factors are loading in addition to 
reducing the amount of factors for explaining motivation, I found four factors working as 
motivations for sorting of waste.  However, because there are positive correlations between 
the different factors, there is covariance and, I cannot claim that the same persons are not 
influenced by different factors. 
 
Evidently, from Figure 10 presented in chapter 5.4, the motivating factors are: personal 
norms, social norms, economic incentives and, encouragement from the authorities.  The first 
two variables are representing internal motivation like shown in Figure 3, and the latter two 
are representing external motivation.  There are, however other variables that are influencing 
motivation and hence, behavior, and which will be added.  Now I will discuss what motivates 
sorting of household waste according to my sample. 
 
Internal motivation: personal norms and social norms 
Personal norms is an internal motivational factor.  According to Thøgersen (2003), personal 
norms represent behavior guided by what is internally interpreted as ‘the right thing to do’ and 
which then represents the individual’s values.  Internal motivation can be defined as 
motivation mainly coming from within, and in Figure 3, which is an overview of how 
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different motivations are defined, we see that internal motivation is constituted by personal 
norms, un-internalized social norms and expansion of utility in the form of good feelings. 
 
In this study, personal norms is held to be a moral obligation or duty to act in accordance with 
what is interpreted to be socially optimal.  This can be said to be an orientation in line with 
the institutional explanation provided in the theory part, holding prevalent institutions in 
society responsible for human action.  Through an institutionalization process, individuals are 
regarded as holding values supportive of and accepted by society as a whole.  Vatn (2005:7) 
finds that internalized norms mainly are “concerned with how we treat our fellows”, and 
hence becomes behavior supporting what is morally right or proper behavior from a ‘we 
perspective’.  There are, however, other dynamics working and affecting the variable personal 
norms that I am using, and which became clear through the factor analysis.  The other factors 
loading on personal norms, and which adds other aspects of motivation to the factor, are warm 
glow and self-image.  These are factors that can be explained through the perspective 
expansion of the utility function in other ways than in economic terms.  
 
The pursuit of the warm glow feeling is according to Andreoni (1990) a rather selfish or 
egoistic act because it represents a maximization of individual utility in the form of wellbeing. 
As a contrast to egoism, which can be seen as a monistic theory, we find altruism as a 
pluralistic theory of motivation.  Egoism is associated with selfishness and unwillingness to 
act if there are no benefits involved, self-regarded behavior or ‘I’ rationality, whereas the 
latter implies an other-directed, or pluralistic motivated behavior, a ‘we’ rationality 
(Berkowitz, 1970).  It has been argued that behavior, which may seem to be morally anchored 
and driven by altruistic motives, is driven by individuals’ urge to enhance self-image 
(Andreoni, 1990).  According to theory, warm glow and self-image are factors representing an 
expansion of the individual’s utility function, and, hence, should be interpreted as 
‘opposites’/competitors to a ‘we-perspective’.    
 
However, since both factors are loading on personal norms, and in addition are correlated, it is 
possible to hypothesize that norms are actually strengthened as a ‘rule of action’ by enhanced 
self-image and warm glow.  Taking information about effects into consideration as well, one 
may argue that there is a similar effect.  Acting according to a norm may pay off in good 
feelings, also when the individual gets information about positive effects of sorting.  Hence, 
there can be said to be a synergy between personal norms and expanding individual utility, 
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and Vatn (2005:151) holds, “much behavior cannot be explained by simply invoking the 
assumption of self-regarding behavior”.   
 
Different rationalities are present in different settings, and contrary to the neoclassical 
position, which holds that rational choice is driven by one logic only; maximization of 
individual utility, and is independent of social context; rationality can be driven by other 
reasons; “behavior is motivated both by individual utility and, there is behavior founded on 
norms, on moral reasoning about what is the right thing to do” (Vatn, 2005:122).  This is, 
moreover, supported by Etzioni (1988), who underlines the presence of involvement based 
upon moral reasoning of what is the right behavior as well as on commitments to others, 
which is behavior based on norms from an institutional perspective.  
 
There is, however, held to be tension between the two different rationalities, the ‘I’ rationality 
and the ‘we’ rationality, and according to Vatn (2005:122), “which rationality applies, 
depends on the institutional context in which one finds oneself “.  However, the variable 
personal norms, as a factor motivating sorting of household waste, can be argued to consist of 
a normative anchoring in the institutional perspective but also of an individual anchoring in 
the theory of rational choice. 
 
Social norms fall within the same category, internal motivation, as personal norms, although 
they are not fully internalized.  In the excerpt of the factor analysis presented in chapter 5.4, 
we see that two of the factors loading on ‘personal norms’ also are loading, however weaker, 
on ‘social norms’: warm glow and self-image.  If we are interpreting social norms as the right 
way of doing things from a society perspective, and remember that they are not internalized, 
there exist either imagined or real threats of sanctions, which acts as factors motivating the 
individual to behave in a certain way.  When the respondents are behaving in response to ‘I 
should do what I want others to do’ and ‘others see me as responsible’, it is evident that 
norms about how to act as well as the view of others’ matters.  Deviations from social norms 
does not bolster individuals’ self image or give warm glow, which can be defined as a loss, 
and in addition, deviation may result in fear of sanctions.  Therefore, one can argue that 
normative behavior is chosen due to individuals’ reasoning of what is best to do given the 
situation in which they find themselves.  
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External motivation: economic incentives and encouragement from the authorities 
Both economic incentives and encouragement from the authorities are external motivations 
working as outside motivational factors for influencing individuals’ decisions of how to act. 
Frey (1997:1) finds “the price system to be completely devoid of morale”, however, solutions 
to social dilemmas can be found when taking the price mechanism into use because rational 
individuals adjust to reap the benefits, represented by the question asking the respondents how 
the new system has influenced their level of sorting, and where nearly half had increased. 
 
According to the neoclassical position, individuals’ preferences are independent of the 
institutional setting, and do not recognize collectives.  Hence, individuals should act in ways 
that benefits them the most.  Accordingly, sorting represents a cost in time and effort and 
therefore sorting is not rational for the individual although it is regarded as rational from a 
society-perspective.  However, recognizing that individual welfare actually is depending on 
others’ actions, has led to recognizing interdependency.  Game theory gives a good 
illustration of how “rational individuals make decisions when they are mutually 
interdependent” (Romp, 1997:1), but the outcomes of such games rarely represents a socially 
optimum because individuals act rational, and do not cooperate due to perceived individual 
costs.  By imposing an economic incentive on sorting of waste in Ulstein, however, this cost 
is flipped around; the inclusion of the incentive has turned the rationale, from being 
individually rational not to sort waste due to costs in form of time and effort, it has become 
individually rational to sort to avoid a large fee.  The incentive may, in addition, work to 
underline the importance of sorting waste to contribute to a healthier environment, but it may 
also contribute to reducing the internal motivation in individuals, as it has the potential of 
crowding it out.  The latter may happen if individuals sorting of moral reasons change their 
reason for sorting to be depending on external rewards and base their action on the price 
incentive only. 
 
Encouragement from the authorities, on the other hand, is a motivational factor based on a 
perceived regulation or command.  Deviation from this regulation has no or little possibility 
of being sanctioned, as there exists no control mechanism.  Hence, encouragement from 
authorities can be said to motivate parallel to social norms as it represents socially desirable 
action.  In addition, information about effect also bolsters this motivational factor.  According 
to Frey (1997:30), “in standard economics, rewards and command are not differentiated.  In 
both cases, deviating from the principal’s desires entails a cost”.  The cost in the first is 
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associated with reward, however, this situation is perceived as voluntary in the way that the 
agent chooses his performance and hence his reward, whereas in the latter the cost is 
associated with punishment if deviated from and hence perceived as more restrictive (Frey, 
1997).  
 
6.3 Explaining behavior  
Sorting of waste can be said to represent socially desirable behavior, and it has been regarded 
as a voluntary contribution to the welfare of society at large.  However, since the dynamics in 
society are continuously altering, different perspectives develop regarding how to explain the 
various ways in which individuals choose to behave.  Taking sorting of waste and the factors 
motivating this behavior into consideration, Frey (1997:57) holds that “individuals are 
prepared to apply much environmental morale in their behavior when it costs them little.  The 
more costly it gets, the lower the weight on moral concerns”.  Hence, we see that 
understanding what factors are influencing on individuals’ choices of how to behave is 
important for understanding how to promote desirable behavior.  
 
Personal norms 
Personal norms came out as a significant predictor for explaining behavior in this study.  
Personal norms are explained both by an institutional and an individual perspective; however, 
it represents morally right behavior from the society’s perspective.  Increased self-image, as 
well as feeling good about one self, are incentives working to promote intrinsic motivation, 
which is an internal motivation found to be a factor of motivation in the long run (DeYoung, 
1986).  According to Thøgersen (1996), sorting of waste is perceived as a moral activity and 
attitude towards the activity is not based on calculating costs and benefits, but rather an 
assessment of right and wrong.  At the same time, however, moral activities are not 
undertaken if the individual cost is too high (Frey, 1997).  
 
Intention behind sorting is related to a person’s attitude towards the activity and how the 
activity is perceived to have an effect on the environment, while social norms do not have 
influence on the intention to act.   Stern (2000:10787) claims that “it is possible to influence 
individual behavior […] by making people aware of the consequences, particularly adverse 
ones, for things they value, and by showing them that their personal behavior is important 
enough to make a difference”.  At the same time he argues that those who do not see 
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connections between their actions and the environmental consequences will not be motivated 
to take action and act by “an internalized sense of obligation” (p.10788).   
 
Social norms 
Social norms did not come out as a significant predictor for explaining general level of waste 
sorting, but proved to be significant predictors for sorting of plastic, clothes and metal waste.  
Since social norms are norms that are not fully internalized, they are adhered to due to fear of 
sanctions.  However, since social norms did not prove to be significant for explaining the 
general level, there may be a reason to believe that norms have become internalized in the 
individuals, and fear of sanctions is not what decides action.  The role of social norms for 
explaining sorting of the three waste categories, on the other hand, may be that there is no 
internalized norm for sorting these categories, and hence, sorting is guided by fear of 
sanctions. 
 
Economic incentives 
From the ordinal logistic regression, Table 12, we see that an economic incentive clearly is 
motivating behavior.  According to my analysis, the economic incentive is one of the main 
motivating factors for sorting, and when asking the respondents about economic gain from 
sorting, over 55% stated sorting of household waste is economically beneficial.  This is also 
evident when remembering that 48% have increased their efforts due to the new regime.   
 
To see how price changes could affect behavior, we proposed hypothetical changes in the fee.   
When considering a hypothetical opportunity of a decrease in the differentiated fee, from 2,24 
NOK to 0,50 NOK per kilo of waste, this is not contributing to changes for the largest part of 
my sample who would keep sorting as before.  According to Figure 17, a small share of 
respondents would both increase and decrease their levels and, evidently, those who would 
increase their effort are not motivated by the fee system, as they clearly have an opportunity 
to increase their sorting level beyond today’s level with today’ price.  Those who would lower 
their effort (nearly 8%), on the other hand, are responding to the price incentive; the cheaper it 
gets, the less one will sort.  This is in accordance with neoclassical economic theory, which 
assumes that behavior is guided by external rewards and therefore that economic incentives 
may lead individuals to act so as to reap the benefits of these incentives, one way or another.  
If a reduction in the fee would lead many to lower their efforts, a crowding out effect could be 
the case.  If the fee was very low it would have been a small incentive, but those solely 
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motivated by it, would lower their efforts, and an opposite effect than intended would have 
been experienced. 
 
When looking at the opposite, a hypothetical increase in the differentiated fee, Figure 16, 
from today’s 2,24 to 5,00 NOK per kilo household waste, almost 26% of the respondents 
would increase their efforts.  This is also in accordance with the price incentive, and in 
addition, considering the amount of respondents believing that the system is based only on 
weight, this increase should be expected.  On the other hand, if considering such an increase 
in the fee, there would be some respondents who would act in the opposite direction and 
lower their efforts. When considering the opportunity of increasing the fee, something that is 
considered by the waste company continuously, to covering the expenses with drifting the 
system, this may lead to respondents deviating from the regime by lowering their efforts as a 
negative response to the system. 
 
Thøgersen (2003) has found that households under a pay-by-weight scheme sorted more of 
their waste for recycling, which is consistent with economic theory.  However, when 
controlling the other variables, he doubts that the behavior can be attributed only to the price 
effect, but also has to do with the fact that the price mechanism has enhanced norms as well as 
perceived self-efficacy which are factors affecting motivation.  
 
When looking at how economic incentives may explain the different waste categories, as 
shown in Table 13, it is only significant as a predictor regarding sorting of organic waste, 
metal and special waste.  Obviously, organic waste has the potential to increase the weight of 
the waste substantially. 
 
Encouragement from the authorities 
As a motivational factor, the variable did not prove to be significant for explaining behavior 
in this study.  Theoretically, nevertheless, it has the opportunity of influencing and bolstering 
peoples’ self-determination and self-image if perceived as acknowledging.  And, hence, 
encouragement from the authorities may enhance individuals’ effort.  For some of the waste 
categories, however, encouragement from the authorities was a significant predictor, which 
may be due to resent information campaigns. 
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Habits 
We see that habits have a high explanatory power on behavior, in both models and in both 
steps.  As was discussed in the theory part, habits can have its origin in both conventions and 
norms, and hence be “automatic responses to specific cues” (Verplanken and Orbell, 
2003:1314), that are developed over time.  However, habits may also develop due to bounded 
rationality, which implies that behavior is carried out simply because it solves a coordination 
problem in the easiest way, and not necessarily is based on moral assumptions.   
 
From the neoclassical point of view, habits are only actions that are repeated because it is too 
costly changing them and thus not appreciated as a function enabling individuals to learning 
(Hodgson, 1988; Vatn, 2005).  According to Thøgersen (1994:416) “behavior that is 
reinforced by an incentive will become habitualized”, however, other studies have shown that 
this complying effect taper off in the long run because people adapt to changes in the 
beginning but fall back to old patterns of behavior after a while.  
 
97.4% of the respondents agreed to some extent that they sorted their waste automatically, 
which shows the instrumental effect of habits.  However, looking at the analysis holding the 
various waste categories as dependent, habits are only significant as explanatory variables for 
plastic and electronic waste.  
 
Knowledge 
Both knowledge about how a system works and how much one must eventually pay when 
utilizing services provided by a system, have the ability of motivating individuals regarding 
how they are performing.  In addition is general knowledge about the environment and the 
detrimental effects of pollution a factor that may contribute to motivating individuals to act in 
a socially desirable way.  In this study, however, knowledge about system and fee did not 
prove to be significant variables for explaining behavior, and there were no correlations 
between knowledge and economic incentives. 
 
Other variables explaining stated behavior 
There are in addition to the variables discussed above, other variables that may help explain 
behavior.  From the analysis, housing type, number of people in household and the 
respondent’s age level proved significant.  The likelihood for those living in houses to be 
sorting at a high level is higher than for those living in apartments.  Evidently, how many 
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people are living in the household also matters, as larger households generate more household 
waste.  Lastly, being in a higher age level increase the likelihood for being in a higher 
category of sorting level. 
 
Summing up explaining behavior 
We have now seen that behavior may be explained by different motivational factors and by 
different theoretical positions.  Economic incentives can be said to represent the neoclassical 
paradigm, which has been widely used to explain outcomes of behavior.  This position has, 
however, to a large extent been criticized as “unrealistic, unproductive and amoral, further 
[…] that the self-oriented, rational behavior modeled by neoclassicists is assumed to occur 
both within the context of personality structure and society” (Etzioni, 1988:2-3).  Critics 
claims that “a move to an I-logic in case after case may ruin the social capital of society”, like 
for example the use of economic instruments in cases where behavior is governed by social 
rationality.  “The effect from this may be a crowding out effect and erosion of moral, thus 
resulting in increased demand for legal regulations” (Vatn, 2009:195).  Ackerman (1997:4) 
finds that because many “goals and objectives are inherently priceless, they would be 
misrepresented or corrupted by the process of assigning them monetary values”.   
 
Contrary to the neoclassical view, the classical institutional position’s perspective on choice 
reject the view on people as consumers only maximizing individual utility and has generalized 
that behavior is depending on institutions.  Experiments have shown that the standard version 
of rational choice as found in economics, is not always suited to explain behavior.  People are 
found to be cooperating in situations where the pursuit of individual rationality is expected, 
and at the same time, pay-offs in certain situations have led to a reduction in the willingness 
to cooperate (Vatn, 2009).  It is found that people’s moral regarding what is the right behavior 
is affecting behavior and, even though individuals are seen as rational and are labeled as 
selfish and only pursuing self-interest, voluntary contributions are often observed (Berglund, 
2003).  Even in situations where it would be rational according to economic theory not to 
participate or contribute, people are found to be contributing.   
 
Following these findings, questions have arisen about the effects of implementing economic 
incentives into regulations because the incentives may “interact with the individuals’ intrinsic 
or internalized reasons for performing the promoted behavior and hence produce unexpected 
outcomes” (Thøgersen, 2003:198).  “With reference to cognitive dissonance theory it has 
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been shown that a positive attitude towards an environmentally beneficial activity can be 
undermined by an over-justification when people are given an extrinsic reason for doing 
something they would have done anyway” (Thøgersen, 1994:413-414). 
 
Even though economic incentives seems to be a significant motivation factor in this study, it 
does not seem to have crowded out the moral reasoning as we can se that personal norms are 
present as a significant predictor for behavior.  The large share of respondents reporting 
behavior based on routine, can be due to internalized norms that have developed into a habit, 
and not because of conscious evaluation of what to do to gain the most.  Geller et al. (1982) 
has shown that attempts to improving environmental behavior by using monetary incentives 
and communicative strategies, only have been successful in a shorter time period. When 
incentives were removed, behavior returned to earlier levels.  Thøgersen (1994:416), on the 
other hand has found that “behavior that is reinforced by an incentive will become 
habitualized”.  However, the fact that behavior is based on personal norms and automacy, 
further underlines that I cannot say that there has been a crowding out effect of moral behind 
sorting, which could have been the case if the norm behind the act continuously was 
reconsidered and behavior was undertaken only based on external incentives. 
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7. Conclusion 
The goal with this thesis was to increase our understanding of what motivates sorting of 
household waste in a regime using an economic incentive, further what role these factors of 
motivation are playing when explaining behavior.  We found that the respondents were 
motivated by internal and external factors and that both individual and institutional theory 
help explain behavior.  The findings supported some of the hypotheses for this study. 
However, due to the low response rate, I cannot generalize from the findings and, therefore, 
further research is needed. 
 
 
What is the level of sorting under a regime using an economic incentive to promote 
sorting? Has it changed with the introduction of this new regime? 
We found that the sorting level score on average is 3.29 where 5 represents full sorting, and 
that 51% of the respondents are sorting mostly or everything followed by 20% who are 
sorting quite much.  According to our findings, 48% have increased their efforts due to the 
implementation of the new regime, and we can argue that its implementation has had an effect 
on sorting level as it has changed in the desired direction. 
 
What motivates sorting of household waste under this regime? 
By making use of a factor analysis, for revealing rear warding factors of motivation, we found 
both internal and external motivational factors.  In line with theory, factors representing 
personal norms and social norms together with economic incentives and encouragement from 
the authorities showed to be factors of motivation.  Through the analysis for explaining 
behavior, however, we found that motivating factors for sorting of household waste under this 
regime are economic incentives and personal norms.  In addition to these clear motivational 
factors, sorting was undertaken, to a great extent, based on routine.  77% are routineously 
sorting their waste without reflecting over the act.  We have also found that housing facilities 
(attributes of the resource and possibility of action) have a positive influence on sorting.  
Evidently, houses have larger room sizes than apartments, and hence, sorting facilities are 
easier to install, which may motivate to increase sorting or even sort at all.  Other significant 
findings that we did not hypothesize around are number of people in the household and age 
level.  Both have a positive influence on sorting.  
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What role do motivational factors play when explaining actual waste sorting behavior? 
Motivational factors play an important role because they are guiding behavior, either via 
internal or external motivation.  Clearly, individuals are motivated differently, and the various 
motivational factors are contributing to promoting (desired) behavior, and hence, they play an 
important role in this regard.   
 
The roles of the motivational factors are different; they are characterized as external and are 
affecting behavior through the use of incentives or rules, or they are internal.  Internal 
motivation, like personal norms, which proved to be one of the significant explanation 
variables for behavior, is founded upon internalized norms and is rooted in the institutional 
perspective.  Internal motivation guides behavior through a moral perspective, which further 
is regarding societal values as important, and hence, is an important factor behind behavior.  
Internal motivation also consists of elements that bolsters individuals’ feelings, and hence 
motivates to continue the behavior.  External motivation, on the other hand, guides behavior 
through the use of, for example economic incentives in this case, and may foster 
individualistic behavior.  On the other hand, individuals not holding internal motivation for 
undertaking an activity may respond better to an external incentive, and thus, external 
motivation guides those who do not respond to internal motivational factors.   
 
Accordingly, motivational factors play an important role when explaining behavior by 
working like determinants for behavior by being able to ‘push’ or guide behavior in certain 
directions.  As we have seen in this study, the use of an economic incentive have led to 
increased sorting, which, from the municipality’s point of view, as well as for society, is 
desirable.  It is important to bear in mind, however, when trying to promote changes through 
implementing external motivational factors intended to guide behavior; they may work in the 
opposite direction and crowd out internal motivation.   
 
What roles can a reduction or an increase in the differentiated fee play? 
Changes in the differentiated fee have the potential to affect efforts according to the price 
incentive, and economically motivated respondents should respond to an increase by elevating 
their efforts and vice versa.  Our findings imply that if the differentiated fee hypothetically 
were considered to being increased from 2,24 NOK/kg to 5,00 NOK/kg, 54% would continue 
sorting at present level whereas nearly 26% would increase.  If the fee was decreased to 0,50 
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NOK/kg, on the other hand, 76% would continue at same level, and only 8% would decrease 
their efforts. 10% would actually increase.  
 
Although external incentives has been largely criticized for the potential to crowding out 
internal motivation; personal norms, this cannot be said to be the case here as we see that 
personal norms are present to a large extent even if there is imposed an economic incentive. 
Hence, we can conclude with the findings in this study that sorting of household waste, in 
addition to being based on routine, is undertaken due to personal norms.  The use of economic 
incentives at today’s level, therefore, has not only increased sorting but it may additionally 
have underlined the presence of personal norms.  However, we do not know for certain 
whether the economic incentive in reality has compensated for a crowding out effect that we 
cannot interpret from the sorting level. 
 
There has in this study not been possible to draw conclusions about the effect of the regime 
due to lack of data on waste levels from last year.  However, through self-reporting, 
respondents states they have elevated their efforts, and hence, based on their statements, the 
regime can be said to have had an effect on their sorting level without crowding out moral 
reasoning for contribution.   
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7.1 Where to go from here? 
It is important to bear in mind that policy and regulation is formed so as to reflect the 
preferences and values of the people of a society.  However, policy also has its point of 
departure in the preferences of these people, and according to Sagoff (1988), people possess 
preference orderings which can be said to be incompatible. “The economic man and the 
citizen are for all interests two different individuals”, they hold different preference maps, 
which eventually have the ability to affect how policies are working (Sagoff, 1988:53).  The 
economic man relates to the market and his individual preferences whereas the citizen relates 
to the political sphere regarding society and what concerns its members, and from this it is 
obvious that “social choices under one set of preferences will not be optimal under an other” 
(p.54).  Hence, a divide is obvious, betweem the rational man, I-focused, taking the role as a 
consumer and pursuing  maximization of own utility as seen in neoclassical economic theory, 
versus the citizen; conserned with what benefits the society as a whole, as seen in classical 
institutional explanations.   
 
Continuing to study the effect of the price incentive for sorting household waste and whether 
it has the ability to affect behavior, without sacrificing the impotant precence of personal 
norms, is considerable for the designing of environmental policies and the implementation of 
systems in the future.  Beside from developing new systems in response to increased waste 
production due to increased consumption, it is important to relate to this quotation of 
Ackerman as well; “to create a sustainable future it will be necessary to act on the 
understanding that there is such a thing as enough, and that many of our remaining needs must 
be addressed through social change rather than private spending” (Ackerman, 1997:185). 
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Appendix I. The questionnaire. 
The original questionnaire was published in Norwegian using Questback, and hence, 
the layout was different. Because question 1 and 2 was about anonymity consern and 
ID number, they are not included here. The questionnaire is translated and reproduced 
below. 
Part A.  About waste sorting 
This section contains questions about the practicality of the waste system in your municipality. Please 
answer all the questions. 
 
3) What kind of fee system is related to the waste system in your municipality?  
Tick one of the following alternatives. 
__ A fixed yearly fee 
__ A fee based on the volume of the household waste 
__ A fee based on the weight of the household waste 
__A fee based on the frequency of the picking up of household waste 
__ Split; a fixed fee + a differentiated fee based on weight 
__ Split; a fixed fee + a differentiated fee based on volume 
 
4) Do you know how much you pay per year for the waste services? 
___ No      ___Yes, ____Kr 
 
5) How much of your waste is sorted?  
Answers should be given on a scale where 1 = nothing and 5 = everything 
1 2 3 4 5 Do not know 
            
 (if you answered 1 = nothing, proceed to question 7) 
 
 
 
 
   II 
6) How much of the following waste categories do you sort?   
Answers should be given on a scale where 1 = nothing and 6 = everything 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Do not 
know 
Paper               
Plastic               
Organic waste               
Glass no 
refund               
Metal waste                
Clothes/Fabric               
Special waste               
Electronic 
waste               
 
7) What makes you sort your waste? 
Answers should be given on a scale where 1 = not correct at all and 4 = Very correct 
  1 2 3 4 Do not know 
Encouragement from the 
authorities           
I want to see myself as a 
responsible person           
I want others to see me as a 
responsible person           
I should do what I want others to 
do           
Sorting makes me feel good           
Sorting is economically 
profitable for me           
I have a duty to sort my waste to 
help contributing to a healthier 
environment           
I think everyone should sort 
their waste even if they do not 
gain from it economically           
Information about positive 
effects make me sort my waste           
 
   III 
8) Other factors that would make you sort? Please specify: 
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
9) What would make you sort even more, and if not sorting, what would make you start? 
Answers should be given on a scale where 1 = not correct at all and 4 = very correct 
  1 2 3 4 
Do not 
know 
Better infrastructure           
The differentiated fee is 
increased           
More information about the 
consequences of sorting           
Information about how much 
the household is sorting 
compared to other households           
The differentiated fee is 
replaced with a fixed yearly fee           
 
10) Other factors that will make you start or increase your sorting? Please specify: 
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
11) Habits. Consider the statement below. 
Answers should be given on a scale where 1 = not correct at all and 4 = very correct 
  1 2 3 4 
Do not 
know 
I sort my waste automatically           
 
  
12) Do you sort all that you potentially can be sorting? 
__ No   __ Yes    __ Do not know 
(If yes, proceed to question 15) 
 
   IV 
13) I do not sort everything I potentially can, because….. 
Answers should be given on a scale where 1 = not correct at all and 4 = very correct 
  1 2 3 4 
Do not 
know 
The infrastructure is not good 
enough           
Sorting of waste is too time 
consuming           
Sorting does not contribute 
enough to a healthier 
environment           
Others are not sorting           
 
14) If you are not sorting all you potentially can, what are the reasons for this? Please specify: 
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
15) Consider the following and pick the suitable alternative. 
Answers should be given on a scale where 1 = not correct at all and 4 = very correct 
  1 2 3 4 
Do not 
know 
I talk with my neighbors about 
sorting           
My neighborhood is engaged 
in the theme sorting of waste           
People in my neighborhood 
perceive sorting as a duty           
I act in accordance with the 
values held in my 
neighborhood           
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Part B. Questions on attitude. 
16) I see myself as more environmentally concerned than average. 
__ No  __Yes  __ Do not know 
 
17) Consider the following statements, and pick the suitable alternative: 
Answers should be given on a scale where 1 = not correct at all and 4 = very correct 
  1 2 3 4 
Do not 
know 
I have a personal responsibility to 
help solving the environmental 
problems           
I do what I can for the environment 
as long as it does not cost me too 
much           
Environmental issues are the 
responsibilities of the authorities           
 
 
Part C. The waste system. 
18) In your municipality there is a split fee on household waste, one fixed yearly fee and a 
differentiated fee based on the weight of the household waste when it is picked up. The fixed fee is 
1356NOK and the differentiated fee is 2,24NOK/kg. Consider the following statements: 
I think the system is……. 
Answers should be given on a scale where 1 = not correct at all and 4 = very correct 
  1 2 3 4 
Do not 
know 
Good, because I can choose how much I 
like to sort and pay for the rest           
Bad, because I would like to decide how 
much I will sort without being punished 
economically           
Good, as such a system is punishing those 
who do not sort their waste           
Good, because such a system gives an 
economic incentive to sort           
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19) Today’s waste system was introduced in January 2009. How has the system affected your sorting 
activity? 
__ I sort less 
__ I sort as before 
__ I sort more  
__ Do not know 
 
20) Does it happen that anyone in the household throw household waste into other waste categories, 
like household waste into the paper bin? 
Answers should be given on a scale where 1 = never and 4 = often 
1 2 3 4 Do not know 
          
(If you answered never, proceed to question 23) 
 
21) It happends that I or someone in my household throw household waste into other waste categories 
because:  
Answers should be given on a scale where 1 = not correct at all and 4 = very correct 
  1 2 3 4 
Do not 
know 
I am not interested in sorting           
Sometimes the household has 
more waste than the bin can 
take           
I do not have to pay so much 
for getting rid of the waste           
Good, because such a system 
gives an economic incentive to 
sort           
I forget           
 
22) Other reasons for throwing household waste into other waste categories.  Please specify: 
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
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23) Do you get rid of household waste without using the waste services provided by the municipality, 
for example burning your waste? 
___No    ___Yes 
 
24) If you get rid of waste without using the services provided, why do you do that? Please specify: 
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
25) Imagine that the authorities on occasion would check your sorted waste, how would you perceive 
such a control?  
Answers should be given on a scale where 1 = not correct at all and 4 = very correct 
  1 2 3 4 
Do not 
know 
It is positive because I can get 
help to sort properly           
It would feel very controlling           
It would motivate me to sort 
even more           
 
 
 
Part D. Potential alternatives. 
26) How would you adapt to potential changes in the differentiated waste fee? 
A) Imagine the authorities decide to reduce the differentiated fee from 2,24 NOK/kg to 0,50 
NOK/kg. 
How would this affect your sorting? 
__ I would sort much less 
__ I would sort a little less 
__ I would sort as before 
__ I would sort a little more 
__ I would sort much more 
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B) Imagine the authorities decide to increase the differentiated fee from 2,24 NOK/kg to 5,00 
NOK/kg. 
 How would this affect your sorting? 
__ I would sort much less 
__ I would sort a little less 
__ I would sort as before 
__ I would sort a little more 
__ I would sort much more 
 
Part E. Background information. 
 
27) Are you male or female? 
___ Male        ___ Female 
 
28) What is your age?  ___ Years 
        29) How many persons lived in your household last year?  _____ Person(s) 
        
       30) What kind of education do you have? 
___ Primary/secondary School 
___ High School 
___ Technical School 
___ University or equivalent 
___ Other 
 
31) What kind of housing do you possess? 
___ House      ___ Apartment        ___Other 
 
 
   IX 
32) What is the total yearly household income before tax? 
___ Less than 150 000 
___Between 150 001-400 000 
___Between 400 001-650 000 
___Between 650 001-800 000 
___Between 800 001-1 000 000 
___Above 1 000 000 
 
 
Part F. Other comments. 
In this section we invite you to share your opinion about the waste system in your municipality, 
this survey or other issues regarding sorting of household waste. 
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Thank you very much for participating. You now have the opportunity to win a gift-card (value: 
1000kr) to be used at ‘Blåhuset’. 
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Appendix II. Statistical analyses 
 
Confidence intervals question 6, different waste categories. 
 
Confidence intervals are used at a 95% level to estimate (the reliability for) a range of values likely to 
include an unknown parameter.  The width of the intervals are studied to get an idea of how uncertain 
we are about the parameter, as the bigger the interval, the more uncertain we are.  
 
 
One-Sample Statistics 
 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Paper 195 5.48 .728 .052 
Plastic 193 4.92 1.291 .093 
Organic 191 2.49 1.841 .133 
Glass without refund 194 4.95 1.521 .109 
Metal 191 4.34 1.790 .130 
Clothing 193 3.79 1.868 .134 
Special waste 193 4.57 1.563 .113 
Electronic waste 195 4.83 1.690 .121 
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One-Sample Test 
 Test Value = 0 
 
 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference Lower Upper 
Paper 105.221 194 .000 5.482 5.38 5.58 
Plastic 52.983 192 .000 4.922 4.74 5.11 
Organic 18.712 190 .000 2.492 2.23 2.75 
Glass without refund 45.358 193 .000 4.954 4.74 5.17 
Metal 33.508 190 .000 4.340 4.08 4.60 
Clothing 28.212 192 .000 3.793 3.53 4.06 
Special waste 40.608 192 .000 4.570 4.35 4.79 
Electronic waste 39.874 194 .000 4.826 4.59 5.06 
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Reliability analysis question 7. 
Cronbach’s Alpha was used to measure the internal consistency in question 7, which is the question 
representing motivation, by measuring the underlying construct.  When the reliability coefficient is > 
0.7, we have an acceptable level.  By using this analysis, one may get an indication of the correlation 
between the items or how closely related they are as a group.  For further study of the dimensionality of 
scale, a factor analysis is computed.  See next page. 
 
Case Processing Summary 
  N % 
Valid 170 86.3 
Excludeda 27 13.7 
Cases 
Total 197 100.0 
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
 
                    Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Based on 
Standardized Items N of Items 
.789 .805 9 
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Inter-Item Correlation Matrix 
 
Encourag
ement 
from 
authorities 
See 
myself as 
responsibl
e 
Other see 
me as 
responsibl
e 
I should 
do what I 
want 
others to 
do 
Warm 
glow 
Economic 
incentives 
I have a 
duty to 
sort my 
waste 
Everybod
y should 
sort their 
waste 
Informatio
n about 
effects 
Encouragement from authorities 1.000 .210 .263 .110 .089 .143 .109 .159 .281 
See myself as responsible .210 1.000 .519 .399 .567 .207 .487 .469 .431 
Other see me as responsible .263 .519 1.000 .496 .367 .241 .308 .381 .286 
I should do what I want others to 
do 
.110 .399 .496 1.000 .365 .140 .269 .247 .239 
Warm glow .089 .567 .367 .365 1.000 .234 .516 .480 .374 
Economic incentives .143 .207 .241 .140 .234 1.000 .197 .042 .182 
I have a duty to sort my waste .109 .487 .308 .269 .516 .197 1.000 .626 .475 
Everybody should sort their 
waste 
.159 .469 .381 .247 .480 .042 .626 1.000 .390 
Information about effects .281 .431 .286 .239 .374 .182 .475 .390 1.000 
 
Summary Item Statistics 
 
Mean Minimum Maximum Range 
Maximum / 
Minimum Variance N of Items 
Item Means 3.708 3.012 4.218 1.206 1.400 .204 9 
 
Scale Statistics 
Mean Variance Std. Deviation N of Items 
33.37 46.862 6.846 9 
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Factor analysis question 7, Motivation. 
Factor analysis was used to assess the underlying dimensions of the items in question 7, further to 
reducing the numbers of variables for more thorough analyses. By focusing on the rotated component 
matrix, an indication is given of the underlying dimension by how the items are loading on the factors. 
 
Correlation Matrix 
  Encouragement 
from authorities 
See myself as 
responsible 
Other see me as 
responsible 
Encouragement from authorities 1.000 .210 .263 
See myself as responsible .210 1.000 .519 
Other see me as responsible .263 .519 1.000 
I should do what I want others to 
do 
.110 .399 .496 
Warm glow .089 .567 .367 
Economic incentives .143 .207 .241 
I have a duty to sort my waste .109 .487 .308 
Everybody should sort their 
waste 
.159 .469 .381 
Correlation 
Information about effects .281 .431 .286 
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Correlation Matrix 
  I should do what I 
want others to do Warm glow 
Economic 
incentives 
I have a duty to sort 
my waste 
Encouragement from authorities .110 .089 .143 .109 
See myself as responsible .399 .567 .207 .487 
Other see me as responsible .496 .367 .241 .308 
I should do what I want others to 
do 
1.000 .365 .140 .269 
Warm glow .365 1.000 .234 .516 
Economic incentives .140 .234 1.000 .197 
I have a duty to sort my waste .269 .516 .197 1.000 
Everybody should sort their 
waste 
.247 .480 .042 .626 
Correlation 
Information about effects .239 .374 .182 .475 
      
 
Correlation Matrix 
  Everybody should 
sort their waste 
Information about 
effects 
Encouragement from authorities .159 .281 
See myself as responsible .469 .431 
Other see me as responsible .381 .286 
I should do what I want others to 
do 
.247 .239 
Warm glow .480 .374 
Economic incentives .042 .182 
I have a duty to sort my waste .626 .475 
Everybody should sort their 
waste 
1.000 .390 
Correlation 
Information about effects .390 1.000 
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KMO and Bartlett's Test 
 Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of 
Sampling Adequacy. 
.822 
Approx. Chi-Square 441.830 
df 36 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 
Sig. .000 
 
Communalities 
 Initial Extraction 
Encouragement from authorities 1.000 .903 
See myself as responsible 1.000 .637 
Other see me as responsible 1.000 .719 
I should do what I want others to 
do 
1.000 .751 
Warm glow 1.000 .644 
Economic incentives 1.000 .961 
I have a duty to sort my waste 1.000 .749 
Everybody should sort their 
waste 
1.000 .711 
Information about effects 1.000 .594 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Total Variance Explained 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Compon
ent Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 3.682 40.907 40.907 3.682 40.907 40.907 
2 1.103 12.258 53.165 1.103 12.258 53.165 
3 .981 10.900 64.065 .981 10.900 64.065 
4 .902 10.027 74.092 .902 10.027 74.092 
5 .610 6.775 80.867    
6 .539 5.992 86.858    
7 .491 5.457 92.315    
8 .376 4.180 96.495    
9 .315 3.505 100.000    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Component Matrixa 
 Component 
 1 2 3 4 
See myself as responsible .791    
I have a duty to sort my waste .743 -.377   
Warm glow .741    
Everybody should sort their 
waste 
.714 -.407   
Other see me as responsible .681 .347   
Information about effects .648  .413  
I should do what I want others to 
do 
.574  -.540  
Encouragement from authorities .335 .560 .601 -.339 
Economic incentives .345 .517  .758 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. 4 components extracted. 
 
Component Matrixa 
 
a. 4 components 
extracted. 
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Rotated Component Matrixa 
 Component 
 1 2 3 4 
I have a duty to sort my 
waste 
.852    
Everybody should sort their 
waste 
.801    
Warm glow .671 .367   
Information about effects .637  .407  
See myself as responsible .584 .515   
I should do what I want 
others to do 
 .856   
Other see me as responsible  .773   
Encouragement from 
authorities 
  .939  
Economic incentives    .967 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 5 iterations. 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
Compo
nent Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 2.646 29.399 29.399 
2 1.808 20.087 49.486 
3 1.146 12.731 62.217 
4 1.069 11.875 74.092 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Component Transformation Matrix 
Compo
nent 1 2 3 4 
1 .777 .551 .226 .204 
2 -.554 .367 .555 .501 
3 .262 -.652 .711 -.021 
4 .147 -.369 -.368 .841 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.   
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.  
 
 
Factor analysis question 18. 
Factor analysis was used on this question to reduce the amount of variables. Two 
factors were extracted and used in further analyses. 
Correlation Matrix 
  
Good, because I 
can choose myself 
how much I want to 
sort and pay for the 
rest 
Bad, because I 
want to have the 
opportunity to 
choose how much 
to sort without 
being punished by 
a fee  
Good, as such a 
system punishes 
those who do not 
sort 
Good, because I can choose 
myself how much I want to sort 
and pay for the rest 
1.000 -.180 .399 
Bad, because I want to have the 
opportunity to choose how much 
to sort without being punished by 
a fee  
-.180 1.000 -.142 
Good, as such a system 
punishes those who do not sort 
.399 -.142 1.000 
Good, as such a system clearly 
gives people economic incentives 
to sort their waste 
.507 -.201 .672 
Bad, as my own motivation 
decrease 
.055 .475 -.077 
Bad, sorting is a duty that should 
be promoted through other 
means than through economic 
incentives 
-.160 .295 -.036 
Correlation 
Bad, as large households are 
punished 
-.204 .454 -.117 
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Correlation Matrix 
  Good, as such a 
system clearly 
gives people 
economic 
incentives to sort 
their waste 
Bad, as my own 
motivation 
decrease 
Bad, sorting is a 
duty that should be 
promoted through 
other means than 
through economic 
incentives 
Bad, as large 
households are 
punished 
Good, because I can choose 
myself how much I want to sort 
and pay for the rest 
.507 .055 -.160 -.204 
Bad, because I want to have the 
opportunity to choose how much 
to sort without being punished by 
a fee  
-.201 .475 .295 .454 
Good, as such a system 
punishes those who do not sort 
.672 -.077 -.036 -.117 
Good, as such a system clearly 
gives people economic 
incentives to sort their waste 
1.000 -.074 -.077 -.101 
Bad, as my own motivation 
decrease 
-.074 1.000 .438 .349 
Bad, sorting is a duty that should 
be promoted through other 
means than through economic 
incentives 
-.077 .438 1.000 .474 
Correlation 
Bad, as large households are 
punished 
-.101 .349 .474 1.000 
 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
 Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of 
Sampling Adequacy. 
.659 
Approx. Chi-Square 341.358 
df 21 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 
Sig. .000 
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Communalities 
 Initial Extraction 
Good, because I can choose 
myself how much I want to sort 
and pay for the rest 
1.000 .563 
Bad, because I want to have the 
opportunity to choose how much 
to sort without being punished by 
a fee  
1.000 .553 
Good, as such a system 
punishes those who do not sort 
1.000 .704 
Good, as such a system clearly 
gives people economic incentives 
to sort their waste 
1.000 .786 
Bad, as my own motivation 
decrease 
1.000 .591 
Bad, sorting is a duty that should 
be promoted through other 
means than through economic 
incentives 
1.000 .549 
Bad, as large households are 
punished 
1.000 .581 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Compon
ent Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 2.547 36.384 36.384 2.547 36.384 36.384 
2 1.781 25.449 61.833 1.781 25.449 61.833 
3 .808 11.541 73.373    
4 .665 9.501 82.874    
5 .526 7.516 90.391    
6 .371 5.304 95.695    
7 .301 4.305 100.000    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Component Matrixa 
 Component 
 1 2 
Bad, because I want to have the 
opportunity to choose how much 
to sort without being punished by 
a fee  
.674 .315 
Bad, as large households are 
punished 
.661 .381 
Bad, sorting is a duty that should 
be promoted through other 
means than through economic 
incentives 
.590 .448 
Bad, as my own motivation 
decrease 
.561 .526 
Good, because I can choose 
myself how much I want to sort 
and pay for the rest 
-.552 .508 
Good, as such a system clearly 
gives people economic incentives 
to sort their waste 
-.612 .642 
Good, as such a system 
punishes those who do not sort 
-.561 .624 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. 2 components extracted. 
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Rotated Component Matrixa 
 Component 
 1 2 
Bad, as my own motivation 
decrease 
.767  
Bad, as large households are 
punished 
.752  
Bad, sorting is a duty that should 
be promoted through other 
means than through economic 
incentives 
.741  
Bad, because I want to have the 
opportunity to choose how much 
to sort without being punished by 
a fee  
.721  
Good, as such a system clearly 
gives people economic incentives 
to sort their waste 
 .884 
Good, as such a system 
punishes those who do not sort 
 .838 
Good, because I can choose 
myself how much I want to sort 
and pay for the rest 
 .743 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 3 iterations. 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
Compon
ent Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 2.240 31.996 31.996 
2 2.089 29.836 61.833 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Component Transformation Matrix 
Compon
ent 1 2 
1 .774 -.633 
2 .633 .774 
Extraction Method: Principal 
Component Analysis.   
 Rotation Method: Varimax with 
Kaiser Normalization.  
 
 
Ordinal logistic regression, holding question 5, stated behaviour as the 
dependent variable to be explained.  For statistical details, see next page. 
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The distribution of the dependent ordinal variable was studied to determine what 
function to use in the ordinal logistic regression.  Normal distribution assumes using 
the Logit function.  
 
Ordinal Logistic Regression 1st step including all independent variables. 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 N 
Marginal 
Percentage 
A little 11 7.2% 
Some 34 22.2% 
Quite much 36 23.5% 
Mostly 56 36.6% 
Stated beh 
Everything 16 10.5% 
House 143 93.5% Housing 
Apartment 10 6.5% 
Male 108 70.6% Gender 
Female 45 29.4% 
Valid 153 100.0% 
Missing 44  
Total 197  
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Model Fitting Information 
Model -2 Log Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept Only 449.192    
Final 368.815 80.377 16 .000 
Link function: Logit. 
 
 
Goodness-of-Fit 
 Chi-Square df Sig. 
Pearson 626.875 588 .129 
Deviance 368.815 588 1.000 
Link function: Logit. 
 
Pseudo R-Square 
Cox and Snell .409 
Nagelkerke .432 
McFadden .179 
Link function: Logit. 
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Parameter Estimates 
 Estimate Std. Error Wald df Sig. 
[NYESTE = 1] 5.418 1.665 10.585 1 .001 
[NYESTE = 2] 7.732 1.734 19.884 1 .000 
[NYESTE = 3] 9.184 1.778 26.678 1 .000 
Threshold 
[NYESTE = 4] 11.927 1.859 41.169 1 .000 
ECON.INCENTIVES .355 .117 9.204 1 .002 
SOS.NORMS.4 -.075 .159 .222 1 .638 
PERS.NORMS.4 .499 .202 6.113 1 .013 
ENCOURAGEMENT .073 .126 .337 1 .562 
EDUCATION -.170 .263 .417 1 .518 
AGELEVEL .216 .295 .536 1 .464 
INCOME -.396 .277 2.036 1 .154 
HABIT .836 .170 24.107 1 .000 
KNOWLEDGESYST .068 .233 .085 1 .770 
KNOWLEDGEFEE .072 .380 .036 1 .849 
INHOUSEHOLD .506 .293 2.989 1 .084 
ENVIRCONCERN -.049 .216 .052 1 .819 
ATTSYST .155 .196 .627 1 .428 
INSTITUTIONS .322 .238 1.839 1 .175 
[HOUSINGTYPE=1] 1.107 .716 2.390 1 .122 
[HOUSINGTYPE=2] 0a . . 0 . 
[GENDER=1] .099 .352 .080 1 .778 
Location 
[GENDER=2] 0a . . 0 . 
Link function: Logit. 
a. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant. 
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Parameter Estimates 
95% Confidence Interval 
 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
[NYESTE = 1] 2.154 8.683 
[NYESTE = 2] 4.334 11.131 
[NYESTE = 3] 5.699 12.669 
Threshold 
[NYESTE = 4] 8.283 15.570 
ECON.INCENTIVES .126 .584 
SOS.NORMS.4 -.387 .237 
PERS.NORMS.4 .104 .895 
ENCOURAGEMENT -.174 .320 
EDUCATION -.684 .345 
AGELEVEL -.362 .794 
INCOME -.939 .148 
HABIT .502 1.170 
KNOWLEDGESYST -.388 .524 
KNOWLEDGEFEE -.672 .816 
INHOUSEHOLD -.068 1.079 
ENVIRCONCERN -.473 .374 
ATTSYST -.229 .539 
INSTITUTIONS -.143 .788 
[HOUSINGTYPE=1] -.296 2.511 
[HOUSINGTYPE=2] . . 
[GENDER=1] -.591 .789 
Location 
[GENDER=2] . . 
Link function: Logit. 
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Test of Parallel Linesc 
Model -2 Log Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig. 
Null Hypothesis 368.815    
General 306.402a 62.413b 48 .079 
The null hypothesis states that the location parameters (slope coefficients) are the same 
across response categories. 
a. The log-likelihood value cannot be further increased after maximum number of step-
halving. 
b. The Chi-Square statistic is computed based on the log-likelihood value of the last 
iteration of the general model. Validity of the test is uncertain. 
c. Link function: Logit. 
 
Ordinal Logistic Regression 11th step. 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 N 
Marginal 
Percentage 
A little 12 6.7% 
Some 40 22.5% 
Quite much 38 21.3% 
Mostly 68 38.2% 
Stated behavior 
Everything 20 11.2% 
House 166 93.3% Housing 
Apartment 12 6.7% 
Valid 178 100.0% 
Missing 19  
Total 197  
 
 
Model Fitting Information 
Model -2 Log Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept Only 458.040    
Final 373.591 84.449 6 .000 
Link function: Logit. 
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Goodness-of-Fit 
 Chi-Square df Sig. 
Pearson 543.136 470 .011 
Deviance 328.956 470 1.000 
Link function: Logit. 
 
 
Pseudo R-Square 
Cox and Snell .378 
Nagelkerke .399 
McFadden .162 
Link function: Logit. 
 
 
Parameter Estimates 
 Estimate Std. Error Wald df Sig. 
[NYESTESTATED = 1] 5.709 1.155 24.418 1 .000 
[NYESTESTATED = 2] 8.110 1.244 42.526 1 .000 
[NYESTESTATED = 3] 9.364 1.289 52.754 1 .000 
Threshold 
[NYESTESTATED = 4] 12.005 1.385 75.150 1 .000 
ECON.INCENTIVES .390 .100 15.208 1 .000 
PERS.NORMS.4 .522 .171 9.373 1 .002 
HABIT .767 .147 27.321 1 .000 
INHOUSEHOLD .391 .232 2.845 1 .092 
AGELEVEL .438 .232 3.546 1 .060 
[HOUSINGTYPE=1] 1.171 .616 3.609 1 .057 
Location 
[HOUSINGTYPE=2] 0a . . 0 . 
Link function: Logit. 
a. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant. 
 
 
 
 
 
   XXXII 
Parameter Estimates 
95% Confidence Interval 
 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
[NYESTESTATED = 1] 3.445 7.974 
[NYESTESTATED = 2] 5.672 10.547 
[NYESTESTATED = 3] 6.837 11.891 
Threshold 
[NYESTESTATED = 4] 9.291 14.719 
ECON.INCENTIVES .194 .586 
PERS.NORMS.4 .188 .857 
HABIT .479 1.055 
INHOUSEHOLD -.063 .846 
AGELEVEL -.018 .893 
[HOUSINGTYPE=1] -.037 2.378 
Location 
[HOUSINGTYPE=2] . . 
Link function: Logit. 
 
 
 
Test of Parallel Linesc 
Model -2 Log Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig. 
Null Hypothesis 373.591    
General 354.234a 19.357b 18 .370 
The null hypothesis states that the location parameters (slope coefficients) are the same 
across response categories. 
a. The log-likelihood value cannot be further increased after maximum number of step-
halving. 
b. The Chi-Square statistic is computed based on the log-likelihood value of the last 
iteration of the general model. Validity of the test is uncertain. 
c. Link function: Logit. 
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Correlation matrix 
A correlation matrix is computed to study the correlations between items.  
Spearman’s rho is used because of ordinal data.  
 
 
Correlations 
 
Encourage
ment from 
authorities 
Educati
on 
Housin
g 
Age 
level Gender Income Habit 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
1.000 -.035 -.152* .270** .019 -.101 -.036 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .636 .036 .000 .798 .165 .613 
Encouragement from 
authorities 
N 195 187 191 193 193 190 195 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
-.035 1.000 -.030 -.138 .044 .388** .010 
Sig. (2-tailed) .636 . .683 .060 .552 .000 .891 
Education 
N 187 188 185 187 186 184 188 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
-.152* -.030 1.000 -.181* -.011 -.113 -.162* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .036 .683 . .013 .883 .123 .024 
Housing 
N 191 185 192 190 190 187 192 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.270** -.138 -.181* 1.000 .006 -.376** .103 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .060 .013 . .936 .000 .151 
Age level 
N 193 187 190 194 192 190 194 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.019 .044 -.011 .006 1.000 -.085 .192** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .798 .552 .883 .936 . .245 .007 
Gender 
N 193 186 190 192 194 189 194 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
-.101 .388** -.113 -.376** -.085 1.000 -.018 
Sig. (2-tailed) .165 .000 .123 .000 .245 . .800 
Income 
N 190 184 187 190 189 191 191 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
-.036 .010 -.162* .103 .192** -.018 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .613 .891 .024 .151 .007 .800 . 
Spearman's 
rho 
Habit 
N 195 188 192 194 194 191 196 
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Correlation 
Coefficient 
.092 -.143 -.001 .059 -.011 .041 -.025 
Sig. (2-tailed) .203 .050 .993 .415 .875 .577 .723 
System knowledge 
N 195 188 192 194 194 191 196 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.022 .060 -.093 .102 -.078 .019 .089 
Sig. (2-tailed) .759 .413 .199 .160 .280 .795 .215 
Fee knowledge 
N 194 187 191 193 193 190 195 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.001 .007 -.251** -.376** -.088 .453** .071 
Sig. (2-tailed) .994 .922 .000 .000 .222 .000 .324 
Number in 
household 
N 194 187 191 193 193 190 195 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.129 -.016 -.051 .079 .059 -.009 .319** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .075 .833 .491 .279 .421 .901 .000 
Envir. concern 
N 191 184 188 190 190 187 192 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.100 -.060 .042 .200** .020 -.122 -.007 
Sig. (2-tailed) .183 .430 .580 .007 .789 .108 .922 
Attitude toward the 
system 
N 179 173 176 178 178 175 180 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.074 .007 -.109 .193** .096 -.157* .259** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .312 .928 .139 .008 .190 .032 .000 
Neighborhood 
institutions 
N 189 183 186 188 188 185 190 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.130 -.131 .099 -.088 .088 -.109 .185** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .071 .074 .174 .224 .222 .135 .010 
Economic incentives 
N 195 187 191 193 193 190 195 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.080 -.136 -.175* .187** .090 -.139 .498** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .269 .062 .015 .009 .211 .056 .000 
Stated behavior 
N 195 188 192 194 194 191 196 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.321** .092 -.068 .010 .105 .014 .294** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .211 .353 .890 .147 .846 .000 
PersNorms 
N 195 187 191 193 193 190 195 
 
SosNorm Correlation 
Coefficient 
.738** -.118 -.044 .132 .088 -.139 .089 
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Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .109 .548 .068 .224 .056 .214   
N 195 187 191 193 193 190 195 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
Correlations 
 
System 
knowledg
e 
Fee 
knowledge 
Number in 
household 
Envir. 
concern 
Attitude 
toward the 
system 
Neighborh
ood 
institutions 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.092 .022 .001 .129 .100 .074 
Sig. (2-tailed) .203 .759 .994 .075 .183 .312 
Encouragement 
from authorities 
N 195 194 194 191 179 189 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
-.143 .060 .007 -.016 -.060 .007 
Sig. (2-tailed) .050 .413 .922 .833 .430 .928 
Education 
N 188 187 187 184 173 183 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
-.001 -.093 -.251** -.051 .042 -.109 
Sig. (2-tailed) .993 .199 .000 .491 .580 .139 
Housing 
N 192 191 191 188 176 186 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.059 .102 -.376** .079 .200** .193** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .415 .160 .000 .279 .007 .008 
Age level 
N 194 193 193 190 178 188 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
-.011 -.078 -.088 .059 .020 .096 
Sig. (2-tailed) .875 .280 .222 .421 .789 .190 
Gender 
N 194 193 193 190 178 188 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.041 .019 .453** -.009 -.122 -.157* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .577 .795 .000 .901 .108 .032 
Income 
N 191 190 190 187 175 185 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
-.025 .089 .071 .319** -.007 .259** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .723 .215 .324 .000 .922 .000 
Spearman's 
rho 
Habit 
N 196 195 195 192 180 190 
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Correlation 
Coefficient 
1.000 .089 .067 -.072 -.136 .008 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .217 .353 .320 .068 .916 
System knowledge 
N 196 195 195 192 180 190 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.089 1.000 .038 .022 .016 .091 
Sig. (2-tailed) .217 . .601 .758 .836 .210 
Fee knowledge 
N 195 195 194 191 180 190 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.067 .038 1.000 .089 -.078 -.171* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .353 .601 . .222 .298 .019 
Number in 
household 
N 195 194 195 191 180 189 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
-.072 .022 .089 1.000 .028 .164* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .320 .758 .222 . .708 .025 
Envir. concern 
N 192 191 191 192 177 186 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
-.136 .016 -.078 .028 1.000 .024 
Sig. (2-tailed) .068 .836 .298 .708 . .744 
Attitude toward the 
system 
N 180 180 180 177 180 180 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.008 .091 -.171* .164* .024 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .916 .210 .019 .025 .744 . 
Neighborhood 
institutions 
N 190 190 189 186 180 190 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.026 .018 .043 .120 .013 .088 
Sig. (2-tailed) .716 .801 .549 .100 .865 .231 
Economic 
incentives 
N 195 194 194 191 179 189 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.031 .050 .112 .276** .046 .233** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .661 .484 .118 .000 .539 .001 
Stated behavior 
N 196 195 195 192 180 190 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
-.068 .054 .029 .415** -.087 .236** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .341 .451 .687 .000 .245 .001 
PersNorms 
N 195 194 194 191 179 189 
 
SosNorm Correlation 
Coefficient 
.082 .008 .034 .145* .095 .101 
   XXXVII 
Sig. (2-tailed) .253 .909 .635 .046 .204 .167   
N 195 194 194 191 179 189 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
Correlations 
 Economic incentives 
Stated 
behavior PersNorms SosNorm 
Correlation Coefficient .130 .080 .321** .738** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .071 .269 .000 .000 
Encouragement from 
authorities 
N 195 195 195 195 
Correlation Coefficient -.131 -.136 .092 -.118 
Sig. (2-tailed) .074 .062 .211 .109 
Education 
N 187 188 187 187 
Correlation Coefficient .099 -.175* -.068 -.044 
Sig. (2-tailed) .174 .015 .353 .548 
Housing 
N 191 192 191 191 
Correlation Coefficient -.088 .187** .010 .132 
Sig. (2-tailed) .224 .009 .890 .068 
Age level 
N 193 194 193 193 
Correlation Coefficient .088 .090 .105 .088 
Sig. (2-tailed) .222 .211 .147 .224 
Gender 
N 193 194 193 193 
Correlation Coefficient -.109 -.139 .014 -.139 
Sig. (2-tailed) .135 .056 .846 .056 
Income 
N 190 191 190 190 
Correlation Coefficient .185** .498** .294** .089 
Sig. (2-tailed) .010 .000 .000 .214 
Habit 
N 195 196 195 195 
Correlation Coefficient .026 .031 -.068 .082 
Sig. (2-tailed) .716 .661 .341 .253 
Spearman's rho 
System knowledge 
N 195 196 195 195 
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Correlation Coefficient .018 .050 .054 .008 
Sig. (2-tailed) .801 .484 .451 .909 
Fee knowledge 
N 194 195 194 194 
Correlation Coefficient .043 .112 .029 .034 
Sig. (2-tailed) .549 .118 .687 .635 
Number in household 
N 194 195 194 194 
Correlation Coefficient .120 .276** .415** .145* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .100 .000 .000 .046 
Envir. concern 
N 191 192 191 191 
Correlation Coefficient .013 .046 -.087 .095 
Sig. (2-tailed) .865 .539 .245 .204 
Attitude toward the 
system 
N 179 180 179 179 
Correlation Coefficient .088 .233** .236** .101 
Sig. (2-tailed) .231 .001 .001 .167 
Neighborhood institutions 
N 189 190 189 189 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .273** .273** .743** 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 .000 .000 
Economic incentives 
N 195 195 195 195 
Correlation Coefficient .273** 1.000 .206** .230** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . .004 .001 
Stated behavior 
N 195 196 195 195 
Correlation Coefficient .273** .206** 1.000 .366** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .004 . .000 
PersNorms 
N 195 195 195 195 
Correlation Coefficient .743** .230** .366** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .001 .000 . 
 
SosNorm 
N 195 195 195 195 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Correlation between today’s system and economic incentives 
A correlation was computed between the 2 variables to see whether they were 
correlated. 
 
Correlations 
 Economic 
incentives Todays system 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .286** 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
Economic incentives 
N 195 195 
Correlation Coefficient .286** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
Spearman's rho 
Todays system 
N 195 196 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Results from ordinal logistic regression with waste categories as dependent. 
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Appendix III. Original frameworks. 
Vatn’s framework for analysing resource use problems (Vatn, 2005): 
 
 
Ajzen’s model from theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1991): 
 
 
